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7-0-I-C-B-S
''Is It not strange that men woiild assume to
know so imich about the constitution of God
when they admittedly do not understand the
constitution of an ant?"
Gregory of Nyssa
"For is this a subject, in which philosophers
can propose to make discoveries, especially
in so late an age?"
Demea (Hume)
"The psychology of the Infinite is exceed-
ingly obscxire."
— George Croft Cell
Yet, nevertheless:
"From this wave-washed mound
Itoto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drowned,
]2iles and miles distant though the last line be.
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond.
Still, leagues beyond those leagues, there is
more sea,'*
—
- Daniel Gabriel Hossetti.
(Sonnet 73b)

CShapter I — IHTRODUCTOHY
** * **
la. The Nattire of the Problem
How shall we think about God? This question as to the
nature of God is more important today than the older one of the exis>
tence of 6od» It strikes at the very heart of man's being for "litera-
ture, art, morals, religion, assume a different fonn and acquire a dif-
1.
ferent oontent with change in the attitude toward God*** !Phe present
issue then over the omnipotency of God is one of major importance* It
is well to see what light history can throw on the subject*
Xhe idea of a God, completely good, and infinite in power,
Icnowledge, and duration is more native to philosoi)hy than to religion.
It was never implied or stated by Jesus, and did not appear fully formu-
lated in Christian thought iintil the Council of Hioaea in 325 A« D*
From the days of Philo of Alexandria, Hebrew thought had been merging
with Greek speculation* In Jesus, the Hebrew-Christian gave the "perfect
life" to the Graeco-Roman for the "perfect incarnation*" IThe conception
of an infinite God grew out of the philosophical syi^oretism of the period^
and the great value of the idea of the Trinity was that it fnsed, though
unsatisfactorily, those two great streams of thought* However, there were
numerous groups in this early period which did not believe in an omni-
potent, good God* Such were the Maroionites, the Manichaeans, and the
Gnostics in general*
1* Brightman, POG, p* 15*
2* Philo Judaeus, a Jew of the Diaspora* (B. C* 20 — A. D* 54)*

2.
But the oonceptiaa of Sod, defined at the Cotmcil of
Nlcaea was aooepted by the Church throa^ the oenturies as the ortho-
dox one* Oooasionally an Individual or a group contested it, but as a
whole it rested supreme for over a milennium of a priori thought.
Thus, it sank deeply into the religious consciousness* In the Fifteenth
Century we find Thomas More writing: "The only difference between God
and the individual souls consists in this (only)t that God is unlimited
1* 2,3.
and the soul is limited*" In contemporary literature like statements
are readily to be found, and today, multitudes of Christians believe
that this conception is fundamental to the Christian religion* They
accordingly look upon any change "what soever, as endangering the very
existence of the Christian faith*
Nevertheless, the outlook has completely changed from the
psychology of the late Roman Snplre and of the Middle Ages in which
the definition of God was formulated* "All the sciences have been bom
since the Fourth Century, and have changed the meaning of the universe*
4.
The social order has undergone profound modifications*" One of our pre-
sent writers concludes: "The simplest fact is that the Kicene idea of
God does not interpret the world to the modem man; that between that idea
6*
and the world of today there is an impassible gap*" Certainly it is
essential that the conception of God be critically re-examined and in
1* Thomas More (1478-1535): Hoffding, HMP, Vol. 1:289*
2* Knudsoni DG, p* 242: "The most general characteristic of Deity is its
absolutism*" (in the monotheistic sense*)
3* Mackintoshi CEF, p* 266: "***the Power upon whom we can reckon is omni-
potent over the world*"
4* Beckwith, 106, p* 3*
5* Ibid*
m
3.
many respects, perhaps, greatly changed*
It. The factors giving rise to a new view of God»
1.
Various different writers have so folly discussed the causes
necessitating a change in the Idea of God already that it will be neces-
sary here only to mention the chief factors in passing.
The most obvious factor is our utterly different outlook
today upon the world. Copernlcan astrononsy no longer permits us to look
upon the earth as the center of the creative processes, and evolution
no longer permits us to look upon man as the sole end of creation. These
two great changes amidst a million others have transformed our conceptions
in a fundamental way, and leave it nearly impossible for us to understand
the psychology of the early Post-Apostolic period.
However, the most important factor by far has been the
well-known change from the a priori to the a posteriori type of thought;
from the deductive to the inductive reasoning; from the rationalistic
to the empirical. For a long time, the full effect of this change, initi-
ated by Bacon, was not felt. Tradition had too great a hold for any mind
to break from It entirely, even when the data logically required that it
do so. In the presence of the Inquisition, beliefs often had ^t^t has
been suggestively called, "survival value". Today, the fall of authority
is nearly complete: the emancipation fr(»n inquisition and tradition alike
has been achieved. The findings of observation can be critically esti-
mated almost Jiiiolly without regard to their former interpretations and
1. Beokwlth: lOG. In Chapter I, discusses nineteen causes.
Of. Bri^tman, POG. In Chapters I and II is an excellent portrayal
of the ill effects of the orthodox idea of God.

4,
oomieotions* The data must no longer conform to a preoonoeived n^ole, bat
the whole must be coherent with the data* Our foous of attention has
changed from the static, eternal. Ideal whole, to the dynamic, ever-changing
particulars.
This temper has swept from one realm of thought to another.
Having turned man*s view of creation upside down, it preceded to do the
same for his view of nearly everything else. Its apparent validity due
to its seemingly, satisfactorily d^onstrable nature, and its pragmatic
fruitfulness highly commended it, and induced man to give it free range.
Thus, it has penetrated even religion and revised theories as to the
history of religions, the origin of the Scriptures, the psychology of human
experience, and the rise of the idea of 6od«
Perhaps the most practical factor necessitating a revision
of our attitude toward God has been the emotional reaction from the
World \li^r and the present economic deprsssion* These have forced man to
face more seriously than ever, the problem of evil, and the difficulty
of reconciling it with the conception of a good, omnipotent God. This
is true of Protestant and Catholic alike. The Reformation preceded the
1.
adoption of the inductive method and the Protestant idea of God failed
to profit greatly by the new thought. Consequently it remains for the
Protestant and Catholic both to reconcile their a priori conception
with the empirical data.
1. Pointed out by Dr. Cut shall of Illff, in a lecture at Southwestrm
College, Vlnfield, Kansas, 1929*

5*
2b» !Phe ggggestlon of a "finite God«»*
The GhriBtlan religion has no one anthentlo view of God at
its source* Neither Jesus nor the New Testament writers, save, perhaps,
1.
the writer of the Fourth Gospel, ever defined God* As Professor White-
head has keenly observed, "CSiristianity has always been a religion
seeking a metaphysic*" CSiristianity may, therefore, create a metaphysio
which may seem to be an integral part of her, but that metapl^slc may
change or be taken away without necessarily destroying the faith. It is
true that the Christian religion has basic beliefs that it is ccntinually
attempting to ground* Yet, in one sense, it makes a very meager demand
upon reality. Essentially, it requires only a God ^o is predominantly
characterized by love, a universe which is dependable, and work on the
part of all its devotees. It is not necessary, as L. P. Jacks would say,
3*
that the universe be friendly: it is sufficient if it may be relied upon
4* 5*
"to cai«erve the true values" as they are created* Orthodox theology
consequently meets and goes b^ond the demands of Christian faith* Any
metaphysic which does meet the essentials above, though it fall short
of the traditional postulates should be recognized as amenable to Christ-
ianity, and should be critically examined for its rational sufficiency
and practical or dynamic efficiency*
Those 7^0 recognize that the accepted idea of God developed
1* And this writer did not define God technically* — E. S* Brightman*
2* Religion in the Making, p* 50: fiaacmillan, 1926) "Christianity has always
been a religion in search of a metaphysic in contrast to Baddhlsm
v&ich is a metaphysic generating a religion*"
3* An infuriated elephant is not friendly, but it is enough if he will stay
„
dead once he is killed, or it he will do man*s work once he is trained*
4* Hoffding's axiom of religion*
5* Cf* Brightman, POG, p* 121.
1
6.
subsequent to the GSirlstlan rellglozi and really exoeeds the claims made
for God in the New Testament* usually claim that, still the orthodox
1.
view is fundamental in order to retain the dynamic of the Christian
faith. It is interesting, therefore, to note that no one metaphysio has
seemed to be vital for the dynamic of religion* One of the iiost virile
periods in Christianity oame in Apostolic times before the faith had
rationally constructed any world view: then 2£ttthew preached the gospel
in Arabia; Thomas evangelized the Parthians, Uedes, and Persians; Thad-
4.
deue converted Abgar, King of Edessa; and Andrew, the Scythians of
5.
southern Russia* Daring the Middle Ages the Roman Catholic Church held
its own and converted northern Europe, and at its close, the Protestant
Reformation fought its way believing in a God ^o, though infinite,
6*
shared his power either voluntarily or involuntarily with Satan* And
during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries the Deists of the French
7*
Revolution attempted to democratize Europe with practically no God at all*
*
Im Save possibly an apocalyptic one* Cf* Schweitzer, Quest for the
Historical Jesus.
2* Eusebiusj Ecclesiastical History ; trans, by C. F. Cruse. London,
George Bell and Sons, 1879. JSc. 71: p. 24.
3. Ibid*, 111:24, 39*
4* Ibid*, 1:13, 11:1.
5* Ibid*, 111:1*
6* The conception of Satan became quite real during the Middle Ages, and
finally received its best portrayal at the hands of Milton.
7. The Bolshevists, today, as avowed atheists, seek to spread communism*

7.
2a« Work Already Done in this Field
imoh splendid work has already been done in this field*
One of the best treatments is that of A* Seth Prlngle-pattison in his
Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy . The content of this
book, taken from the Gifford lectures for 1912-1913, the author does not
claim to be exhaustive, but it goes far toward correlating an old idea
with modem thought. While he is critical » he above all is constructive*
The Gifford Lectures of 1914-1915 were given by W. R. Sorley.
These, entitled Moral Values and the Idea of God grew out of ethical move-
ment that progressively attracted more and more attention froni the latter
part of the nineteenth century* Hnlike Pringle-Patti son, he did not
attempt to survey the contemporary thought, but was more argumentative*
Dr* Sorley' s lectures sought to show how the existence of values point
to the existence of God, and to develop the ethical aspect of theism*
Following these, there appeared in 1922 a book -vibich had
1*
considerable vogue in this oftuntiy. It was the Idea of God by Clarence
Augustine Beokwith. The book was historical, critical, and constructive,
and sought to reinterpret the idea of God in terms of contemporary
2*
thought 80 as to enable it to **functioa mew in the life of today***
It first considered the causes making a new conception of God necessary;
traced the rise of the orthodox view of God; and then examined the view
In the light of its connections with present-day life and thought; con-
cluding with a revised idea of God which he thou^t would function and
1* Enndson, DG, p* 295*
2« Beckwith, lOG, p. vi*

6be of value today: "The Living God." ©le purpose of the book was cer-
tainly a high one, and Professor Maointosh of Yale, after a oaustio review,
conceded that the book "Is a notable one and makes a valuable contribution
1.
to its subject*" Nevertheless, the popularity of the book has passed*
This Is due to the fact that Professor fieckwlth Implies that there Is no
universally valid idea of God and that the idea also may not refer to a
real metaphysical God, but after all only imbodies the ideal ends of man*
In the same review mentioned above, it is commented, **ln short 'VThat we
see is the traditional Christian idea of God as a ship with a great spread
of sail, but without compass or rudder, set adrift on the troubled sea of
modem opinion, buffetted about by the shifting winds of contemporary
2*
philosophy and scientific or pseudo- scientific doctrine*** This coionent
is quite fair* The work is very good historically and critically. It
falls short in its oonstzructive value*
In the past few years the books devoted to thi s problem have
increased. Among them are two especially outstanding* The first. The
Doctrine of God. 1930, by Dr* Albert 0. Knudson, presents the view of.
traditional theism* It is an exceedingly fine, scholarly book, and has
been ranked as "the first really great book written by an American on
the doctrine of God in the last quarter of a century* It goes far toward
harmonizing theology with out present outlook, in relating faith and
reason; science and theology* But it has the time-long difficulty of
reconciling omnipotence and goodness in God* In a splendid treatment
1. Douglas C* Hacintosh, Jotimal of Religiop . 1X1:654*
2* Ibid*
f
* 1
I
9.
of eaoh of these. It holds to the absoluteness of both* Yet, it fails
adequately to aooount for evil, and assumes a modified fom of the
position of the ancient Hebrew*
OJhe second. The Problem of God. 1930, by Dr* Edgar S*
Brightmsm, presents a departure from accepted theism* It retains the
free creativity, definiteness, and goodness of God on a monistic basis
by positing a dualitsn within God*s nature vchich limits God* s pother*
We shall consider its rather unique solution later* Suffice it to
say here, that Dr* Brightman has singled out the idea of a '^finite God**
and has ab),y presented it as the logical conclusion of the empirical
data* He slcetohes the development of the idea of God in two chapters on
the expansion and contraction of God and shows the considerations that
led him to conclude that God is lirrited* He extends and supports the
1*
idea further in the Finding of God ^ich appeared only this last year.
Each of these books has dealt directly or indirectly with the
idea of a "finite God" and has referred to other thinkers who have held
the idea* But no work thus far has tried definitely to trace this idea
through the modem era* This, we shall try to do now*
1* Cf* Lewis, GAO, for criticism*

10.
3a. Purpose and Delimitation of Present Study.
Che primary purpose of this thesis is not to attempt to
exhaust the field, or to criticize the idea save v^en necessary. It will
point out how different philosophers have limited God, and often leave
the reader to decide whether the limitation seriously impairs God's
power, freedom, and influence. Above all, it will seek to show that the
idea is not a new one, or one that has appeared only at the time of
such catastrophes as the Lisbon earthquake, or the Irish potato famine.
It will seek to place the idea in its proper setting as one of the
major currents in the idea of God, and give it a histoxy.
Ihe thesis will deal with the most outstanding proponents
of the idea critically, with the positions of other thinkers briefly
indicated* In doing so it will seek to point out yfh&t factors have been
most influential in giving rise to the idea.
4a. Concerning Terms
(Che term "finite God" has been used as an offeet to the
infinity of God. In philosophy it technically means "subject to limi-
1.
tation." However, the use of the phrase is unfortunate for it suggests
indefinite limitations, and to many people its first connotation is that
of time. Yet, though its supporters maintain God is in time and subject
to change, they do not mean that He is not eternal: God is unlimited in
1. Of. Zion* s Herald, Sept. 23, 1931. P. 1193.
(
duration* In additi6n the term finite has often been used to contrast
man and God. Henoe, as infinite hyperbolizest finite belittles, and many
people Infer that a finite God has no more power than man; "a finite God
is no God at all*** As Omar woxild say: "USho is the Potter pray, and
who the pot?** A better term would be that of a ''limited God*" Q3iis term
has less objectionable connotation than "finite** yet is broad enough to
allow different philosophers to draw limits as their logic demands*
(Those who limit God*s power alone might use the expression, a "potent
God,** stressing God*s power which is at least wonderfully greater than
man's, without affirming its infinity (omni)* The word "finite** and
the phrase "finite" God is now old and established, but throughout this
thesis, it will mean a potent, "but limited God."
*
5a* A Brief Sketch of the Idea of God
Prior to liodem Times
The idea of a finite or a limited God is not a new one*
Among a multitude of views it was extensively held the Greeks in
their view of God as a carpenter-deity limited by the nature of his
material* In fact, **Greek thought, on the T;hole, represents the divine
1.
notion as that of an artificer limited by the qualities of his material*"
In Anazagoras we have the idea of the eternal nous, or reason, which
2*
moves and orders the elements that are also eternal* We have a similar
3*
suggestion in Plato's term, "Demiurge" or world-forming God, and in
1* Pringle-Pattison, lOG, pp* 400-401*
2* Windelband, HP, pp* 41-42*
3* Op. Cit., p. 130*

12.
1.
Aristotle* s "Prime-Mover", or the "Pure Pom." Plato and Aristotle
both tried to oonstruct a monism. Yet, Plato, said, "God is truly Good
2.
and cannot te the cause of evil," and Pringle-pattison goes on to say
3.
that Plato saved God* s goodness at the "expense of omnipotence*" In
the Republic . Plato definitely states, "We mast be prepared to deny that
4.
God is the cause of all things." '*Vhat is good we must ascribe to God,
5.
but we must seek elsewhere, and not in Him, the causes of Mthat is evill"
And Windelband comments upon Aristotle's system: "Even Aristotle had
not become clear as to the relation of the unmoved mover to that v;hich
6.
was moved." "Aristotle's divine Pure Form stood in an incompletely
7.
explained relation to matter." Perhaps the best proof of the failure of
Plato and Aristotle to establish a monism is to be found historically in
the period of religious dualism that followed, in which a Platonist
like Plutarch "treated matter as an original principle side by side with
8.
the deity." "By their fruits ye shall Icnow them."
Parallel with the speculative growth of the Greek idea of
God (Good), developed the Hebraic experiential idea of God. The Hebrew
thought of his God as the Creator of all things, but the Hebrew was in
no real sense a philosopher. The problem of evil remained a dark mystery
to him. His fundamental thesis of God as the source of all things made
the goodness of God an insolvable problem, and he maintained his faith
Windelband, HP, p. 145.
Pringle-pattison, lOG, p. 400.
Ibid.
Jowett (trans.) Dialogues of Plato . 111:62-63.
Pringle-Pattison, lOG, p. 400.
Windelband, HP, p. 236, and refers back to parag. 13, where he speaks
of matter as passive, and potential, and of God as active and actual.
Brightman, POG, p. 82.
Windelband, HP, p. 239.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
i
13.
1.
in a righteous God on an agnostic basis. The great speculative question
of the Hebrew in the Old Testament was, **Why should the righteous suffer?**
2.
and no real answer was ever made to it. !?he authority of the Hebrew
God solved the question by resolving it. If the Hebrew had come to a con-
clusion upon the basis of the evidence he had, he would have had to sacri-
fice either the goodness or the omnipotence of God.
The Hebrew idea passed into the Christiant the Greek into the
Roman. In the following period an atten^t to fuse the Hebrew-Christian
into the Graeoo-Homan was made by two great forces. Gnosticism and the
Catholic Church.
Gnosticism was a great atyncretistic movement, religious rather
3.
than philosophic. Although it appeared in the East several decades
4.
before the Christian Era, it did not come into its greatest prominence
until the Second Century, A. D. It was fundamentally dualistic in its
outlook, and was primarily concerned with the problem of evil. Partly
because it had the Greek attitude toward matter and partly because it
identified matter with evil. Gnosticism could not reconcile matter with
the creativity of God. It saw clearly into the problem of the Hebrews.
When it interpreted Hebrew Scripture, it refused to identify the Creator-
God of the Old Testament with the Father^God of the New Testament* and
for the Hebrew doctrine of creation it substituted a doctrine of emanation.
%stioal as well as rational, it gave rise to various theosophica^ systans
1* So Genesis lil
2. Thus, in Job no solution is reached. In chapter 32, Job is silenced
by the demonstration of God's power and wisdom. Cf. II Esdras.
3. Ayer, J. C.t A Source Book for Ancient Church History . N. Y. :Scribner» s,
1926. pp. 76-77.
4. Walker, A History of the Christian Church . N. Y.i Scribner's, 1928. p. 54.

14.
i
1*
and has itself been oalled a theosophy. J> tiring the Fourth Century,
Gnostioism crystallised into Maniohaeism whioh emphasized the Zoroastrian
antagonism of li^t and darkness* The Ifianichaeans olaimed that there
was a thorough-going diialism in reality: an evil coi tending ^ith the
good* They thus held to a finite God, and as they persisted in various
forms iintil the Crusade of the Churoh against the Cathari (Albigensians)
3.
in the Thirteenth Century, they had an important influence upon the early
Christian and Mediaeval mind*
In opposition to the Gnostic movement, the Catholic Churoh
restricted its teaching largely to the historical data, and attempted to
bar Oriental, Parsio, and Egyptian influences* In the Christian comnun-
ities, the Christian teaching of inmortality and another world with its
Jud^nents and rewards solved the question on yAi&t was essentially the basis
of Hebrew agnosticism* This has been one solution, if solutiCD it may
be oalled, from that era to the present time* The position is classically
stated by Hume* s character, Demeat
'*T!his world is but a point in comparison with the universe;
this life but a moment in ccmparison with eternity* The
present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other
regions and in some future period of existence* And the
eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of things,
will see the v^hole connexion of general laws; and trace, with
adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through
all the mazes and intricacies of his providence*** (4)
1* Schaff, Philip: History of the Christian Chilrch* N* Y*: Scribner*s,
1927* Vol* 11:500 f* (Jakob Boehme, -see p. 19- bears a close
affinity to this theosophy)* 11:449*
2* Schaff, ibid*, H:500f.
3* Thomdike, L*: The Histlgry of Medieval Euro-pe * Boston: Houghton Mfflin,
1917* p* 444*
4* Humei SCR, 11:441
3
15
If It were safe to generalize, one would say that in the Catholio Church
daring the Middle Ages the attitude toward Grod was Hebrew-Christian, and
the content of the God-idea was Graeco-Homan. With the coming of the
Renaissance with its humanisn and Greek-culture, the content of the idea
is to change first, and the attitude toward God will follow more slowly*
But those fiho hare disbelieved in immortality or who have
refused to accept the agnostic position find no comfort in Demea*8 sol-
ution. These have had to face the problem. Finding no basis for a
rational solution in either the Greek or the Hebrew position, they have
dissolved the difficulty by weaving theodicies, and "from the days of
Job and his comforters, the devising of such theodicies — theories to
save the sittiatien — has been the main business of theology and theo-
1.
logical metaphysics." In modem times theodicy has grown increasingly
unpopular. This is not because modem thinkers believe that there are
no longer real limits to human knowledge. They realize as much as any
that though the finite may apprehend God, it can never comprehend Him,
and that the fact of probability as Cameades and Bishop Butler pointed
out must remain the guide of life. However, they do wish to keep their
conclusions down to what evidence they have and to relate their facts
to the rest of hman knowledge, on an empirical rather than a purely
speculative basis.
*« « Id** * **
4> * *
*
1. Brightman: POO, p. 25. Cfd. , Cushman: Beginner* s History of Philosophy .
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., (1911) 1920, 2 vols.. Vol. 11:267.
Cf. also Lewis: GAO, Chap. I.

C9iapter II
INDSPMDEflT FORMDIATIONS OF THE IJ)M IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
la* Pierre Bayle and the Theedioy of Leibniz
In France in the Seventeenth Century, the skeptic, Pierre
Bayle (1646-1706) sought to refate the deism of his age Ijy discrediting
1.
rationalism in the name of faith* He accordingly denied the established
thought systems; among them the theodicy of Augustine ^ich had Justified
the goodness of God throughout the Mddle Ages* "So much suffering in
the world'*, he said, "is inconsistent with the idea of a good, all-power-
2*
ful God.** He thus stirred up once again the problem of evil \^i6h had so
long rested in troubled sleep on its Procrustean bed, and made it the
question in the philosophy of religion for a century*
Sayle*8 contenrporaxy, Leibniz (1646-1716) came to the aid
of religion and attempted to reconcile again the power of God with its
imperfect manifestation* After almost a lifelong study he concluded
'*that the evil in this world can detract so little from its perfection
that, in spite of all its evils, this world is more perfect than any other
world woiild be even though it contained less evil, because it would also
3*
as regards perfection necessarily stand below the existing world* He
distinguished physical and moral evil from metaphysical evil, but made
1* IQiudson: DG, p* 363* Cf* Funjer, HCPH, p* 448*
2* Ibid., Punier*
3* Ibid*, p* 505*
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them dependent upon the latter. Being a rational! at, he prooeded almost
ix^olly from oause to effect* He argued that before oreation, God
looked oyer all the worlds that might be created and chose this one
as the •*best possible*** God then created all things out of nothing*
He did this as a free act* Yet, as the created units or monads were
to be different from Himselft he could not make them perfect* If
they were perfect, they would be identical with Himself* Q9ierefors«
monads are imperfect, all imperfection is evil, and evil is a rational
necessity in a finite world* "Ihe world could not exist without suf-
1*
fering and sin*** If it did it would be less perfect than the present
one* "Hence, in spite of these evils, we may regard it (the present
2*
world) as the best possible world."
This view was widely accepted at the time and developed
a philosophical atmosphere of deterministic optimism, but it was really
no solution* Voltaire, reacting to the Lisbon earthquake, ridiculed the
3*
idea, and Mill a century later, pointed out that Leibniz did not "main-
tain that this is the best of all imaginable, but only of all possible
4*
worlds*" Leibniz* s God was after all limited* Leibniz **tacitly assumed
an abstract possibility and impossibility, independent of the divine
5*
power," and limited God "by an antecedent reason In things which makes
6*
certain combinations logically incompatible, certain good impossible."
1. Enudsoni DG, p* 363*
2. Ibid*
3. In Oandide . 1755, and in correspondence* Cf* H$ffding, miP It461.
4. Mil, TER, p* 40, note 1*
5* Ibid*, Cf* Schiller, RS, p* 308: "Thus Leibniz* s famous Theodicy
depends on a limitation of God***
6* Jamas, FU, p* 119.
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Within God are two principles: contradiction and sufficient reason. Re
never clearly related these to one another tod they '^existed", so to
1.
speak, "side 1^ side, in independence. •* Leibniz, therefore, held to a
logical necessity according to which God worked, but it is inconceivable
that there be something that might not have its contradiction. If God
had sufficient reason to foresee the coa sequences and the best imagin-
able world, he would have constructed it rather than only the best pos-
sible world. Though Leibnlx would not admit itf his system logically
involved either a finite God, or a denial of the existence of evil.
2a. Anticipation of the Problem by Jakob
Boehme
Leibniz's limitation of logical necessity was, in a way,
2.
anticipated "by Jakob Boehme (1575-1624), *philosophus Teutonlcus*, the
shoe-maker of Gorllts. This 'powerful mind* as Hegel called him,
throu^ his iqystician knew God as the ''supreme, fundamental, universal,
self-existent, eternal cause; absolute and unimaginable in glory, per-
3.
feotion, goodness, beauty, magnificence, and splendour." Contrary to
most mystics, he did not stop with Madame Guyon at the contemplation
of the **A11", but continued to theosophy. His chief aim was to "explain
4.
the origin of things, especially the existence of evil," and this he
did in a system which was nominally monistic and pzsctically dualistic.
1. Haldane, in ERE 7X1 :692b, 893a.
2* Often given as Behmen in English.
3. Hartmann, LDJB
4. Chamber* s Encyclopedia, art., "Boehme".
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Bodhma osoillates between a dtiall stioally constituted Absolute God, and a
1,2*
God ^0 is the Deity aspeot of the "All.**
Eren before Hegel* s Absolute* the Urgrund of Boehme vjas a
"man of Hl^r**. Boehme starts vdth the principal that all revelation calls
4.
for "opposition". The Urgrund, or God is the primordial infinite asleep
— at rest. Tet, it does not really exist, and God cannot be without
being* He conceives within Himself a will, and this will is love. The
will is light; it desires to create and when it does so, the ^imatrix with
its fiery, dark, acid, and bitter qualities became manifest." This
shows that in "God there are (really) two states, eternally and without
7.
end;namely, the eternal light and the eternal darkness." As Boehme
8.
expressly says, "It is God against God." One of these states is the
9.
"substratus of real natvire; the other that of divine personality". The
substratum (matter) is never transfonned into Spirit, but is Illumined
10,
and glorified by the latter. Upon it the spirit works and through it the
spirit is enabled to become manifest. The external world then is "pro-
11.
duced by the motion, and outbreaking of divine power and divine will.
1* Such as Alexander's Deity, SPD II*
2* "As soon as the devils went out of the light and attempted to rule
by the power of the fire over the beautitudes in the heart of God,
in the same moment they were outside of God and in the four lower
qualities of eternal nature*" Threefold Life . 2:50: quoted by
Hartmann, pp* 114-115*
Cf* here, Brightman, POG, p* 137* "Jakob Boehme speaks of a *fire of
anger within God*."
3* Hoyce* s oomnent on HegeX*
4* Boutroux, HSP, p. 163.
5* Hartmann, LDJB, p. 66, quoting Boehme* s Threefold Life . ii:75.
6* Ibid., p. 150, quoting Aurora . v:24*
7* Op. cit., quoting Three Principles. ix:30*
8. Hoffding, HMP: quoting Boehme' s Mffrgenrote xlv:72. HMP 1:76.
9. Boutroux, HSP, p. 192*
10* Hartmann, LDJB, p. 73.
11* Note similarity to Greek "Architect" conception*
I 1
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It has been outbreathed from the holy and from the dark -world* It is
"both evil and good." The good oomes from God's free will; the "evil
1.
from the involuntary ground of God's nattire."
Consequently Boehme* s revelation found its solution to
the problem of evil in a struggle within God*s nature. 'She battle in
the miorocosm of man has its counterpart in the maorocosmic battle
3.
within God. Boehme limits God* s will by God*s nature, and therein
4.
limited both God*s knowledge and God*s power, but he maintains the
goodness of God* s will and the beauty of God*s love. Evil is, there-
fore, in the world because God cannot help it. God* s nature is "like
5.
a revolving wheel." But man does not need ever to fear this evil.
It can never lead to cosmic catastrophe, for God*s good-will is the
only active element.
Boehme thus straggled with the question. He said a great
deal about God for ^ich there would seem to be no evidence, but he
maintained that it was all revealed to him: "I have not dared", he
wrote to a friend is 1620, "to write otherwise than was given and indited
to me." His system was really influenced by Wiegel, Paracelsus, and
Eokhart, and his reasoning grew out of the principle of contradiction
1. Hartmaxm, LDJB, p. 165, quoting Igysterium iii:10
2. Hoffding, HHP, 1:75.
3. This is difficult to harmonize with Hoffding* s statement, "This idea,
too, iinderlies Jacob Boehme* s motto: He to vHo-om time is as eternity,
and eternity as time is freed from all struggle." HSffding, HMP
p. 225. This is psychologically true, but a departure from Boehme'
s
cosmio process."
4. Hartmann, LDJB, p. 78.
5. Thus, "God does not will evil; neither did he foreknow all things would
happen as they have happened." Hoffding, HUP 1:75 quoting Mb'rgenrote
ziv:72. Cf. Hartmann, p. 78, quoting Menschwerdune ii:4.
6* Quoted in Jones, SRC, p. 152.
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or opposition*
Despite persecution, Jakob Boehzne found a number of followers
even during his life-time* In England, King Charles I was attracted by
his writings, and in 1687, Henry More, in his oriticism of German philoso-
1.
pliy was so bold as to reooninend them* 5oehme*s views as a whole, however,
were restricted to scattered groups of theosojihists until they influenced
2*
Schelling and Hegel in the early part of the Nineteenth Century*
3a* ISae Revival of Boehme*8 Speculations "by
Schelling and G* Hegel.
In the later decades of the Eighteenth Century, "Germany
was alive with xqystical movements, old cosmogonies were revived* Jakob
3*
fioehme once more was an author of the day,'* and he had an important influ-
ence on the romantic phase of Geiman idealism* Fichte, Schelling, and
Hegel felt the impact of his thou^t* Fichte was least affected for his
interest was chiefly in man* s moral natuie* But Schelling shows Boehme*8
influence quite obviously, and Hegel obscurely so*
a?he philosophy of Priedrich Schelling (1775-1864), who
4*
Hegel, said, "carried on his philosophical education before the public",
5*
may be divided into three phases: the agnostic, pantheistic, and theistic*
In the first he followed Fichte and rejected a metaphysically real Supreme
1* punjer, HCPR, p* 264.
2* Stallo, PH, p. 220: this movement was inspired partly by the mysticism
of Spinoze, which was influenced by Boehme.
S* "In Boehme we have an obscure presentation of the thesis, antithesis, and
^nthesis which have a large application in the philosophy of Hegel*"
Chambers Encyclopedia, article, "Boehme***
4* Watson, STI, p. 1*
5* Ibid., p. 2*

£2.
Being* In the second he regeurded nature as well as man as a manifes-
tation of a divine power; and in an attempt to prove that In the Absolute,
subject and object were one, he parted with Fiohte and became a pantheist*
He had more and more difficulty, however, in maintaining a **continuoas
1.
transition from the Absolute to the concrete reality,** At first, under
the influence of Fiohte* s thought, this was due to the irrational nature
of the Ideas* But as he became more acquainted with Boehme, he decided
it was due to an irrational element within the Absolute itself, fhis
3.
led to his third period, the religio-philosophical in which he tried to
prove the personality of God ^ile preserving the moral responsibility of
man.
How can God be the source of all things; yet not be all
things (pantheism) and still have a personality of his own? Schelling,
sought to answer this question by a theodicy very similar to that of Boehme.
In his most able work of this period, he "attempts to show that we are
only Justified in conceiving God as a personal being if we posit an ori-
ginal antithesis within the Absolute; with the essence of the Deity; a
dark, irrational ground which becomes purified and harmonized as he had
taught in his philosophy in the course of the life-development of the
Divine-Being.'* The action of the Deity upon this irrational ground pro-
duced the world and as the good comes from Deity the evil comes from
5,
the irrational ground. If God destroyed this Irrational ground he would
1, Wlndelband, HP, p. 617*
£• Ibid., p. 618.^
3. So called by Hoffdlng, HMP, 1:171.
4. Ibid., 1:171. Of. Ueberweg, HP 11:29.
5. Watson, STI, p. 225.
II
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destroy His ovm personality, for to Schelllng a relation of opposition
within itself was neoessary* And as this irrational is evil, God is pre*»
Tented also from destroying evil itself.
Sohelling, thus limited God by a rational necessity which
called for contradiction and opposition -within the divine nature: a
rational necessity like the Fates of the Greeks. His Absolute was not
in such tumult as Boehme's, however, for in God the two elements exist
1.
in indissoluble tmlty whereas in human beings they are far apart* God* s
2*
Activities all seek to identify the real and the ideal*
Schelllng' s views were ridiculed at the time as Gnostic,
and the attention which Schelilng later gave the Gnostic writers shows
that this was a tendency* One of his chief efforts, throughout, was
to refute the emptiness of Spinoza's Absolute under whose influence he
3*
fell for a short time, and to give his Absolute a definite character*
lb* The Negativitat of Hegel
s
Perhaps Hegel (1770-1831) learned from the difficulties
4*
of his versatile friend, and former master* He broke with him when
Schelllng fell under the Influence of ^inoza's pantheism and his "egos"
became meaningless, and Hegel called Schelllng' s Identity, "the night,
in which all cows are black."
Nevertheless, Hegel carried on Schelllng' s speculation*
Asking the questions, "i2hat is it that prompts the incessant evolution
1* Watson, STI, p* 226*
2* Stallo, FN, p. 222
3* Snc* Brit*, article, "Bo^ime"
4* Though Hegel was older than Schelllng, he was one of Schelllng'
s
followers for a time*
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of the Eternal, the Deity, the Absolute? Why is the Spiritual a
Histoxy, and the natural a general? Why is the infinite intensity of
mind brought to life in the infinite extension of matter? What foroes
the idea to become a fom, the *word to turn Flesh*, and the form again
1.
to resolve itself into an idea?" and seeking to ansvrer them, hoivever
vaguely, he developed his philosophy*
Hegel attenrpted to achieve his famous absolute idealism
Ify the use of the principle of contradiction and opposition. Like
Boehme and Sohelling, he introduced inherent self-opposition into his
Absolute* His "first principle, which is efficient and also final cause
of all, the immanent cause or causa- sui " was &od» This God \vas self-
conscious Season and forever engaged in a double aotivityt (1) Separating
Himself from Himself in the act of knowing Himself as object, therefore
by creating of Himself all forms of chaos and the chaotic; (2) in the
recognition of Himself as object, annulling the chaos and chaotic,
creating the rising spiral of Nature, and resting from creation with the
3*
contemplation of His image." This imceasing activity is made possible
and necessary by the fact that there exists within God an everlasting
4.
negative, which Hegel calls the HegativitSt ."^ GThis negation is the
5.
vitalizing power ndthin the Deity. It is "its driving force" and brings
6.
about both "destruction and production." It limits Deity, but this is
1. Stallo, FN, p. 332.
2* Ueberweg, HP, 11:29, and Stallo, loo. cit.
3. Harris, Wa, To., trans., Hegel's First Principle, p. 7f 11.
4. It is hardly possible that God himself created the NegativitSt, for God
had no incentive for creating euaything before it existed. Consequently
the Absolute must "possess Negativitilt as its own principle or law."
As Baldwin says. Diet, of Philos. . "Kegel's Terminology: negativitSt.
5. Balllle, in SHE VI :579b.
6. Baldwin: loc. cit*
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an advantage for *^the merely unlimited is a spurious infinite. Genuine
1.
infinity means self-determination," It was in view of this that
2.
Royce called Hegel »s Absolute, a ••man of war."
In spite of all this activity within the Absolute, it
would be impossible to say that Hegel really held to a "finite God"
unless, he failed to construct an Absolute Idealism* ^is it really
3*
appears, Hegel failed to do. He proceeded from the "maqy" to the final
"one" by the use of his Dialectic. The dualism of thesis and anti-
thesis was constantly resolving itself into a eynthesls of one, which
became a new thesis and by a principle of infinite regression finally
reached a solitary Absolute* In this process it was necessary that
thesis be the contradictory of the antithesis, and in Hegel's semi-
4*
finals, they are not. ^irit and nature are the two realities and these are
not opposites, even in his thought* They are complementary. He sought
to overcome this by positing a Logos rndiich was the synthesis in the
secondary activity and the thesis in the primary activity of the cosmic
process* The heart of the difficulty was that the Logos is neither
4a.
rational nor substantial but an expedient, in ttbich is seen the dark foun-
5*
dation of the old metaphysic* It was really the Absolute of Schelling,
which Schelling gave up when he deserted his absolute idealian for theism*
6.
It was a meaningless mental fiction* Hegel's real God was either the
1* Staoe, POH, p* 146*
2* Royce, Josiah, The Spirit of Modem Philosophy . Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
(1692) 1924* p* 214*
3* So Crooe: FHE, Chapl X*, "Dualism not Overcome*"
4* Ibid., p. 199*
6* Ibid., p. 200.
4a* Ibid., p. 201.
6. So Brightmani POG, p. 85. "If you expand an idea beyond all definite
meaning, it has suddenly turned into nothing at all, a like pure-being
in the first triad of Hegel's logic*"

«6*
Deity aspect of the Absolute fighting a necessary principle of Negativi-
tat also a part of the Absolute; or else it ^nras God fighting an eternally
given Neg9tivitSt: the two were independent and the Absolute a fiction*
Ihus, in the systems of Boehme, Schelling, and Hegel we
have a God who is either struggling against another force or else a God
within whom conscious purpose is fighting an eternally given principle
which is contradictory and rationally necessary to adapt the a priori
conception to the actual situation*
4a. Independent Speculations of David Hume
Meanviiile in Scotland, David Hume (1711-1774), thorough-
1.
going empiricist and the most important forerunner of modem positivism,
doubtless stimulated by Pierre Bayle, had independently taken up the
religious problem. His approach was suggested by the subtitle he gave
to his Treatise on Human Hature: "an attempt to introduce the experi-
mental method of reasoning into moral subjects.** He parted entirely
with the whole rationalist school and its idealist successors, and in-
verted their method. His claim that not cause but only sequence can be
2.
empirically demonstrated seemed to dissolve the Deistic metaphysio of
3.
the day. then the rumor got out that 'the terrible David* had written
a manuscript on religion, the upholders of religion made little effort
1. Hifffdlng, HHP 1:440.
Zm "We see one event following upon another, we do not see one event causing
another. So far Hume*s contention has never been refuted. Every-
vrtiere in Nature, so far as external experience goes, we discover se-
quence, but no causality." Hashdall, PAW, p. 82.
S* Windelband, HP, p. 494.
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1.
to conceal their panic: Rone's publisher, Strahan, refused to produce
the book; his friend, Adam Snith, refused to edit it, and the manusH
cript. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was not made public for
twenty- seven years.
Logically, Hume* s psychological associationism gave him
no grounds for any idea of God, at all. Yet, he did not really doubt
the existence of God. In a note appended to the Treatise , he said:
**Ihe order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind. Nothing more
is requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of religion.'*
The discussion in the Dialogues which leurgely assumes the existence of
God, was written in the •nnaturity of Hume's powers" and gives some of
Hume's most deliberate and carefully weighed ooncluslonGu Here three
characters discuss the subject of God; Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes.
4.
Demea represents the traditional standpoint and Philo plays the part of
4a.
skeptical objector to the arguments of Cleanthes, the philosoohioal
5.
theist. We will not stop to consider the argument, but only to show
the view which Hume himself held. Of course Demea does not represent
Hume's standpoint. Philo* s skeptical attitude reflects Hume most, and
6. 7.
he acknowledged in a letter that Philo* s view interested him most.
But by his own confession it is Cleanthes who is made the hero of the
dialogue, and Cleanthes' s position ^ich he would like to see strengthened
1. Pringle-Pattison, ICG, p. 4.
2. written in 1751 and publiEihed 1778.
3* In Green and Grose's ed.: Bd. I, Pt. Ill, sec. 14, p. 456. quoted by
Pringle-Pattison, lOG, p. 15.
4, Pringle-Pattison, 100, p. 5. Of. E. B., article, "Hume**.
4a. Ibid., p. 2.
5* Ibid., p. 3.
6. Burton, Vol. 1:332: Letters to Strachan - given in Hoffding, HMP 1:438-9.
7. H6'ffding, HHP 1:438-9. "Philo's standpoint is imquest ion ably nearest Hume'
o-si-n."
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and proved. Fhilo refutes the orthodox claims of Demea by saying, "Our
Ignorance, in short, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning
the divine attributes, but it can never be sufficient to establish that
conclusion*** Yet, Hume believes that the world legitimately manifests
God. "The Deity," he argues, "I can readily allow, possesses many powers
and attributes of vthich we can have no apprehension. But if our ideas,
so far as they go, be not just and adequate, and correspond to His real
la.
nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. And
the consideration of the empirical data prompts Cleanthes to suggest}
"But then supposing the author of nature to be finitely
perfect, though far exceeding mankind; a satisfactory account
may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every
imtoward phenomena be explained and adjusted. A less evil
may then be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; Inconven-
iences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end:
And in a word, benevolence regulated by wisdom, and limited
by necessity, may produce just such a world as'^present." (1)
Hume's position then would seem to be this: He woi^d like
to transcend his empiricism and believe in God. However, the empirical
facts from which the nature of God must be deduced, do not point to his
infinity and strongly suggest that great as He must be. He is finite.
Hume leaves it here, and f^lls to intimate the nature of that -which limits
God*
la. Bssavs on Natiiral Religion , p. 405, THN 11*406, Longmans, 1890
1. Hume, THN 11:444.
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5a* Conclusion of a "finite God** reached
also Isy Voltaire and Housseau
Hhe Eighteenth Century probably found more ferment in the
idea of God in Prance than in any other coiintry. The best negative for
any affirmative is a complete denial, and in a country ^ere the suffer^
ing of oppressed serfs had reached the breaking point, doubts as to the
goodness of an omnipotent God ^ould arise without the stimulus of a
Sceptic Bayle and a Lisbon earthquake, and many abandoned the theism of
the church for atheism* So it was that Diderot, the leader of the Ency-
1*
clopaedists wrote in a letter in 1760, "Belief in God is to harmless
matters it begets evil in two ways* In the first place it inevitably
involves a form of worship, vhen ceremonies and theological dogmas soon
take the place of natural morality, and deform Its precepts* Second,
since the great suffering that is in the world is contrary to the idea
of a good God, men are reduced to all sorts of absurdities and contra-
dictions in order to palliate th}s fact* In the latter case religion
2*
is contrary to reason, and in the former to morality***
l^either of the two most outstanding men of the period
were atheists, however* ITelther were they great scholars or systematic
philosophers, "though they thought for most of their countrymen, and
left a mark on France and Europe never to be effaced*** Hhase were
Voltaire and Rousseau*
1* Lettres a Mdlle* Voland, 20th. Oct., 1760, and 6th. Oct*, 1765*
2* Quoted in Ho'ffding, HMP 1:48.
3* ERE XII:634a*

90*
Yoltalre, greatly Influenced by Descartes and Locke, was
a deist* Because of his attaolc upon the institutional Christianity
of his day, he has often been thought an atheist. Bat this is a mistake.
1.
In one letter he wrote, •*! shall always be convinced that a watch proves
2.
a watchmaker, and that the xiniverse proves a God." In another, "I^
reason tells me that God exists; but it also tells me that I can not
know what He is." Voltaire believed in the resdity of God and the
existence of God, but he thought God was limited by matter and neither
omnipotent nor omniscient. In his Philosophical Dictionary, he argued
that though our experiences told us of a supreme ''intelligence strong
enough to form", to preserve and to reward or punish one, we do not
know it can do more and our experience bears evidence that the power
is limited. Matter he seemed to regard as external to God and the
5.
bearer of laws of its own.
This duali£Di was likewise characteristic of Rousseau. He
said that the reason his experiences of suffering in the world did not
destroy his belief in a good God was because of his doctrine of two sab-
stances, mind and matter, and that matter imposed limitations on the
6.
carrying out of the divine ends. It is true that in his Confessions of
a Savoyard Vicar . Rousseau says, "If God exists. He is perfect; if He
1. To IS. M. Kahle, 1744, quoted in SHE XII :632a; footnote #2.
a. To Mile. Quinau^t, Oct., ;737: quoted ERE XII :633b, footnote #1.
3. See articles, "Power", "Omnipotent", p. 240.
4. He quotes Hume.
"
^Particular Providence : "A weight of ten ounces is
lifted in a balance (of) by another weight, therefore, this other
weight is of more than ten ounces, but one can adduce no reason why
it should wei^ a hundred ounces.* PhD, p. 240.
6. So op. cit., p. 244: "Turn in every direction, and you will find no
other solution than that evezything has been necessary."
6. nSffdlng, HMP 1:495.
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1. 1*
Is perfect. He is wise, almighty , and Just; if He is Just and almighty
iny soul is immortal; if my soul is immortal, thirty years of life are
nothing to me, and these years, with all that happens in them may be
neoessazy for the maiutenanoe of the universe* 9 But we want to remem-
ber Rousseau's dualian, and that he is confessedly following feeling
and tradition rather than reason and logic in the statement* His argu-
ment in the Confessions is "that the reason might be against belief
in God and immortality, yet feeling was overwhelmingly in their favor,"
2.
and we should trust instinct here* Because Rousseau's religion con-
sisted "properly speaking In enthusiasm and finding in the world traces
3*
of a power which works for good, '*hls letter to M. Beaumont is especially
significant when he frankly faces the evils of life and states: "The God
4*
vih.0 orders and guides is good, but He is not omnipotent*'*
•««««•
*
5a* Comnon gx>ounds for Limitation in the
Sixteenth Century
Thus, we have seen that the idea of a finite God appeared
in a variety of forms in the Eighteenth Century* Stimulated by the
claim of the skeptic Bayle, that suffering in the world was inconsistent
with the idea of an all-powerful God, new views of God were advanced
which limited Him in various ways:
(a) Leibniz limited God by an antecedent reason in things
1* Italics mine*
2* Caird, EOL, pp. 124-125, quoted in Durant, SP, p. 264*
3* Hoffding, HUP 1:495*
4* Ibid., p* 495*
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that made the best imaginable world of God, impossible: a
monism wliioh plaoed a rational necessity alongside, God*s
free-will*
(b) Schelling and Hegel revived Boehme*s cosmogony and
limited the will or the active element in God, a meaningless
absolute, by an involuntary ground in God*s nature which was
exposed by the will as soon as the will itself became mani-
fest*
(o) Hume, refusing to speculate, speculated that the order
of nature, which made experience possible, pointed to God,
but that experience testified to the limitation of God*s
power.
(d) And Voltaire and Rousseau revived the old Greek ccaicep-
tion of artificer, limited by matter which was to some extent
independent, and had a nature of its own*
Among all these, with the possible exoepticn of Leibniss we
find two characteristics that stand out: a decided aversion to regarding
all evil as disciplinary and to the attempt to rationalise a harmoziy
between evil, and the power of God«
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C!hapter III
DEVELOPliMT OP THE IDT&k PRIOR TO THE V.'ORLD WR
*
In the long period extending from the latter part of the
Eighteenth Century to the beginning of the World War, the reality of
suffering and Its origin played a less obvious part, and the idea
of a limited God chiefly took the fonn of two lines of purely philos-
ophloal speoulation* The first of these was due to a movement which
sought to ascribe or to extend personality to &od when it was believed
1.
that personality and infinity werS mutually exclusive. The second was
due to the rise of the great school of Pluralist s who held to the mets^
physical reality of the many selves, whether created or uncreated.
Both of these movements were greatly affected by the development of
evolutionaxy thought*
la* The Speculative Controversy
over Personality and Infinity
2*
Deep respect for the idea of personality had been growing
in the Eighteenth Century, and in the Nineteenth Century it was one of
the values which Schelling tried to preserve (see page 21f«) It was
3.
essential to the "state^philosophy* of Hegel* The Scottish school from
Reld to Hamilton especially had recognized its importance, and emphasised
1* Hoffdlng, msP 11:460
2* Knudson, IXr, Chap* 8, p* 287 esp* In which he points out throng the
Trinity, the Christians had chiefly thought of personality in God
until in the Eighteenth Century they began to speak of the person-
ality of God*
3* landelband, HP, p* 639*
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the validity of inner experience in contrast to Hxime's paychological
assooiatlonism* Thus« personality was more and more recognized as the
highest quality in man. In harmony with the Hnmian proposition that our
ideas in this world are just and adequate as to God* s real nature, (see
1.
page ZQ) the tendency was to extend it to God, Himself, as at least an
essential.
However, the Scottish School was out of sympathy with the
trend. While pointing out the importance of inner experience, it recog-
nized its limitations as well, and held to a practical agnosticism.
William Hamilton (1788-1856) claimed: "Yet, l>y the necessities of the
case, we are driven to belief in an unconditioned reality, lying beyond
2.
the conditioned.'* As to think is to condition, this 'nanconditioned'*
cannot be constraed by thought. Absolute and infinite, it is simply
the negation of the relative on the one hand and the negation of the
3.
finite on the other. "For anything further we are thrown upon faith."
"The last and highest consecration of all true religion is an altar *To
4.
the Unlcnown God*".
H. L. Mansel, working on the theory of Pierre Bayle, adopted
5.
this agnosticism "into the service ©f revealed theology." In his
"Limits of Religious Thought" , he differentiated sharply between person-
ality and infinity in God, and maintained we could not conceive God
6.
as both. Certain conditions are necessary to human consciousness;
1. Hume, THN 11:444.
2. Davidson, ERE II :270b.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., quoting from Hamilton's Pi sou s si on
s
. p. 15 (n)
5. ^indelband, HP, p. 638.
6. Hoffdlng, HMP, 11:460.
I
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(1), there must be a distinotion between one object and another which
Implies limitation; (2)t there must be a relation between subject and
object; (3), a succession and duration in time which makes all objects
finite and creation impossible; and (4), consciousness implies person-
ality which is a limitation and a relation and hence inadequate to repre-
1.
sent the Infinite* Dean IJansel could not conceive of personality trans-
cending these limitations* "Our knoTrledge of God, therefore, is relative,
and not absolute —- the Infinite is an object of belief, but not of
thought or knowledge; hence, we may know that an Infinite God exists, but
2*
not what He is as infinite*'* Therein, he denied the moral likeness
"between God and man, and the possibility of man*s Judging by reason or
. conscience what claims to be the revealed mind and will of God ••••
He rested the claim of the Scripture to be accepted entirely on exter-
nal evidences and admitted the possibility of moral as well as physical
3.
miracle", holding that God could suspend the laws of right as well as
the laws of force*
Hamilton and Mansel thus sought to maintain the infinity
of God by refusing to make the highest in man a measure of God* ISiay
preferred an "unconditioned". Mansel failed to recognise that this was
as dangerous to religion as to philosophy^ A more vholesonie view is
that of Paulsen who claims that though we may not define "God by the
concept because the concept is too narrow ••*•• in so much as the human
mind is the highest and most important thing we know, we can form an
1* Mansel, LBT, lecture #3*
2* Ibid., lecture #4.
3* A. £• Garvie, in EHS (Agnosticism) 1 :217b, 218a*
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1.
idea of Sod only by Intensifying human attributes,"
(a?he relation of some of the philosophers who held this
agnostic view of God, to eaoh other, may be indicated by the following
Diagram:
*
*****
*********
*****
«
Heid
Utto. Hamilton
Dean ISansel
Herbert Spencer
2a. Omnipotency and the plural ists
In contrast to the Scottish agnostics, was a group -^^ioh
was more anxious to have an intelligible God than it was to have an
unlimited one* Hhis group consisted of the plural! sts.
lb. How "Plural i an" limits Gods
Z.
Kie word "pluralist", first used by Wolff, and introduced
3.
into America by Bowne, has a variety of meanings and its school is
by no means unified. It essentially holds to the reality of individ-
ual selves who exist at present, and perhaps from the beginning, inde-
4.
pendent of a cosmic soul. Different types limit God in different ways,
according to the relation they permit between the finite selves and
the finite God, but the whole school of thought necessarily limits God
in that it shares His authority with autonomous selves.
1. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy , p. 264. N. Y. : Holt, 1898.
2. Of. Krugs Philos. Diet ., as Wahl, POEA, p. 317. Of. Eislerj Worter-
buch der Philosophischen Begriffe via POM, p. 319.
3. Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism, p. 189. First used in America
in Bowne* s Metaphysics. 1882, pp 130, 365.
4. Wahl, POEA, p. 317.
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The Spirit and Value of Plurallamt
As a philosophy, pluralism grew rapidly both in England and
America. Its spirit of willingnesB to oonfront a ohaos gladly and una-
fraid appealed to the adventurous spirit of virile Anglo-Saxon indivi-
dualism. Professor James vigorously presented it as a philosophy for
1,2.
the tough-minded. In addition it reconciled a type of philosophic
thought with religious needs. It enabled one to Uelieve "in the exis-
tence of a personal God and to understand the existence of evil." Conse-
quently it seemed to unite "finally what appeared to the pluralist the
lasting value of romanticism with his enduring need of an empiricist
4.
method."
gb. The position of John Stuart Mill:
It may seem illogical to place Mill among the pluralist
s
as he lived before the rise of the Pluralist-Pragmatic School. Yet,
5.
his views were essentially theirs and James dedicates his work on Prag-
matism to him saying: "to the memory of John Stuart Mill from whom I
1. Wahl, op. cit., p. 96: "Finally, if we consider the Stevensonian sense
of adventure and peril, the Alcyonian (Dionysiac?) element, as
Nietzsche would have said, all that is youthful and venturesome in
the soul of Stevenson, the love of risk in Browning, the stern cour-
age of the hero as represented by Henley and Kipling: are not all these
so many revelations of that English soul ixhioh would attempt to find
self-expression in the doctrine of the pluralists?"
2. And evaded the rigor and difficulties of the synoptists. (Carus*s
relaxed philosophizing.)
3* Ibid., p. 98.
4. Ibid.
5. Mill wished to discover as many laws in Nature as there are distinct
qualities and sensations; he denied the presence of a general element
in things and attempted a pluralist logic which saw only differences
and resemblances in the world and perceived no identity, so Wahl,
POEA, p. 90.
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first learned tiie pragmatlo openness of mind and v^om fancy likes to
pioture as our leader, were he alive today*
Mil was especially the foreranner of the pluralists in the
formiilation of a "finite God*" His concept of God was influenced in part
1.
t>y the new emphasis upon personality, but more so "by the problem of evil
2.
which his empiricism placed before him so persistently. Teufel sdrookh
taught Mill to see the world in all its flow and ebb of "good and evil
things, to see the constant efforts of the principles at strife." He
drew his conclusions chiefly from his earnest examination of nature ^ich
3.
he indicted as no man save Augustine had ever done before:
"Next to talcing life, (which he has just described) is
taking the means by which we live; and Nature does this
too on the largest scale and with the most callous indif-
ference. A single hurricane destroys the hopes of a sea-
son; a trifling chemical change in an edible root, starves
a million people." (4)
His conclusion was that "Omnipotence cannot be predicated of the Creator
on the grounds of natural theology for the fundamental principles of
natural religion as deduced from the facts of the universe negative his
5.
omnipotence*
^y y^at, then did Mill conceive God to be limited? God was
obviously "compelled to submit to conditions which were independent of
6.
His will." The oosiditions were imposed, as the Greeks believed, by
matter which existed coextensive with God, and independent of God's
1. "Whatever relates to God, I hold with Sir W. Hamilton to be matter of
inference". Quoted in Wahl, loc. cit., p. 98.
Z» Doubtless as the Lisbon earthquake affected Voltaire, the Irish potato
famine affected Mill.
3* Enudson, Glass lectures.
4. Mill: TER, pp. 29-31. Cf. with note #5, page 35.
6. Mill, op. cit., pp. 180-181: cf. Hoffding, HMP 11:429.
6* Mill, op. cit., p. 177. Cf. Hgffding, HMP 11:429 again.
II
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1*
will. This matter had neither intelligence nor personality xAlch thwarted
the pruposes of the Creator. Evidently it had an "active inertia" which
God could partly but not wholly overcome. Neither His knowledge nor Hie
skill was infinite and He may often have chosen contrivances that were
3.
not always the best possible. Nor was God really free. If He were. He
might have ignored Matter and created without regard to it. ••Who would
4.
have recourse to means if to attain His end his mere word was sufficient?"
Matter was not merely passive, but God was engaged in a real struggle
with it. The creation of man and his world was a necessity resulting from
the clash of God with the evil powers of force and matter.:
"The only admissible moral theory of Creation is that the
Principle of Good cannot at once and altogether subdue
the powers of evil, either physical or moral; could not
place mankind in the world free from the necessity of an
incessant struggle with the maleficent powers, or make
them always victorious in that struggle, but could and
would make them capable of carrying on the fight with vigor
and with progressively increasing success.'* (5)
Mil did not really believe that this dualism with its
"finite God" was contrary to either popular, thoughtful belief, nor to
the teachings of Christianity. He pointed out that the only difference
between popular Christianity and the religion of Orrauzd and Ahriman on
this matter is that the former pays its Creator the bad compliment of
having been the maker of the Devil and being at all times able to crush
1. Mill, TESt p. 178. "There is in Nature no reason whatever to suppose
that either matter or force, or any of their properties, were made by
the Being who was author of the collocations by which the world is
adapted to what we consider as its purposes; or w that He has the
power to alter any of these properties."
Z, Ibid., p. 166.
3. Mill, TER, p. 181.
4. Ibid., pp. 176-177.
5. Ibid., pp. 36-39.
i
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and annihilate him and his evil deeds and counsels, y^ioh nevertheless,
1.
He does not do. Mill really believed those ^o were strengthened in
goodness by relying on the sympathizing support of a powerful and good
governor of the world, never really believed that Governor to be, in
the strict sense of the term, omnipotent. "They always saved His good-
ness at the expense of His power." lEhey believed, perhaps, that He
could, if He willed, remove all the thorns from the individual path, but
not without causing greater harm to someone else or frustrating sane
purpose of good and greater importance to the general well-being.
4b. The Position of William James;
William James, the most important of the pluralistic prag-
3.
matists, was greatly influenced by Mill, as well as by Browning, Carlyle,
and saiitman. He changed Mill*s pluralistically inclined dualism into
4.
a pure pluralism, adopted his idea of a '*flnit3 God", made a gospel out
of it, and popularized the notion*
There is some possibility that James only played with the
idea of a "finite God" and really believed in a polytheism; a theological
5.
pluralism like that of Menard, Fourier, Renouvier, and Feohner. These
men believed in a hierarchy of souls and James became familiar with the
6.
theory through Fechner. James himself employs the idea from time to
time. Before he wrote The Varieties of Religious Brperienoe he spoke in
1. Mill, TER, p. 163.
2. Ibid., p. 40.
3. Wahl, POSA, p. 116.
4* Of. ibid., p. 179, "Jaunes is both a pluralist and a dualist; over against
the chaos of beings stands out a divine personality."
5. Wahl, POEA, p. 62.
6. Bixler, HPJ, p. 137, and Wahl, p. 182.
f
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1.
the plural of the powers that govern the universe as Gods, In the
Pluralistic Universe he wishes to show that a polytheism "has just as
many claims on our thought as the monotheistio hypothesis has.** And
in Pragmatism he exclaims, "Wherefore should God be an 'exalted omni-
potent monarch?* In truth, God is but one of our auxiliaries, primus
inter pares, *in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's
3.
fate.'"
However this may be, James's great service to the idea
of a "finite God" was his popularizing of it» Mill's Essays concerning
the subject were published posthumously in 1874, and Hume's Dialogues
were not published until his death. But James, like Dr. Brightman
today, was neither ashamed nor afraid. Declaring that he was trying to
4.
get a real God, "The God of Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac," he adapted Mill's
statement that the "duty of man is to cooperate with the beneficent powers,
not by imitating, but l?y perpetually striving to amend the course of
5.
nature," and made men co-workers with God in the fight with evil.
James's cosmology was briefly thisj The universe is chaotic.
God did not create everything. He is finite either in knowledge, in
6.
power, or in both. Evil exists independent of God in the material order*
God cdong with outrselves fights against it, and each is strengthened by
7.
the other. Indeed, God himself may borrow "from our fidelity to Him,
1. Bixler, RPJ, p. 137, 182.
2. mil, TEH, p. 183 (n.l)
3. Wahl, POSA, p. 182.
4. l^cConnell, IGL, p. 104.
5. Mill, TEH, p. 65.
6. James, PU, pp. 311-312.
7. Pringle-Pattison, lOG, p. 394: "...a superhuman person who calls us to
cooperate in his purposes and vto.o furthers ours if they are worthy.
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1.
the power and greatness of His being»»*
5b. The position of F« Oa S« Schniers
It was, partly, in Mil's worlc also that the English humanist
and pluralist, Schiller, found his ground for deciding on the conception
Of a personal and
-finite God." In his essay on Lotze'he states that the
half- suspicion entered Lotze's mind that the nature of the Absolute
which he identified with the Deity may have something to do with the
4.
lamentable failure of his attempts to account for evil. Por Schiller
5.
there must be a "not-God" to react upon God.
Schiller was especially interested in the problem of iramor-
^* 7. 8.tality which James had hardly touched. He arrived at a monadology, and
thought of the world as chaotic, con«isting of free and active spirits
iidiich have been and cannot cease to be: the idea of a cosmic society.
1. Wahl, POSA, p. 181.
2. Schiller, HUM, p. 80.
3. Wahl, POEA, p. 91.
4. Note Schiller's criticism of 7on Hartmann's "Absolute" RS., p. 324.footnote 1. tr 9
5. Schiller, RS. p. 304. Cf. Brightman: Outline for Course in RelfeiousValues, p. 41. « »
6. James did consider the problem in his Ingersoll lecture of 1897-1898.
nl^^^T'f theJr^MiBsive function of the brain. However, for him,
Zi.f r i^'^i^^ iinmortal life has its prime roots in personal
fHi^^ ^! further said, "I have to confess that my own personaleeling about immortality has never been of the keenest order, and
n^?^T''f^*^^
problems that give my mind solicitude, this one doesot take the foremost place." James, Human Immortality
. Boston:
Bi^er ^^X""^^''^ ^''^'^ 1922. See p. 3. Ho;ever, Of. also
7 "PnJ^! ; It
I°»»o^tality". Jour, of Rel. 7,378-396. esp. 387.
LL«^ T""^ the many, their supreme ruler and aim.. .the exls?
finite' J ffiJ' fi^'fv '^^^l*! «^Plai° also how God can be
8. WahrpJm. as! '
oo-e.istence of other individuals." p. 349,
9. Schiller RS, p. 350. "The world is evil because it is imperfectlv har-monixed with the divine will."
r iiy iiar
10. "Evil is anti-social". Ibid., p. 352.
I
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1.
a oolleotlTlm of personal lives," His God differed from that of James in
that it was one God. He had no plturality of or hierarchy of Gods, nor
2.
an independent matter, but did have eternal spirits, immortal soids,
3.
living in pre-ezi stenoe and metempsychoses.
6b. The -position of J. M. E. McTaggart;
Pringle-pattison points out that McTaggart v-ould probably
repudiate the label of Pluralism "inasmuch as he believes the universe
4.
to be a systematic Tshole," but he fails to build this belief into his
theory for "there appears to be no self in his ^harmonious system of
5.
selves* which knows all the other selves." We shall consider his
position here, therefore, as it resembles that of Schiller in its con-
ception of persons.
McTaggart ruled out both the oranipotency and the creativity
of God and raised the question, "Could there be a God who was just a
6.
person more wise, good, and powerful than any other?" He rejected the
idea of God as creator, because of the reality of evil. A creator has
7.
nothing but his own nature to determine him, and, if "a being who is
completely self-determined produces evil, knowing that it is evil, how
1. Wahl, POM, p. 214.
2. Schiller, HS, p. 267. Parag. 17f.
3* Wahl, POM, p. 215. Cf. Schiller, HS: "No rational argument in favoxur
of immortality can be devised that will not tell as strongly in
favor of the pre-ezistence as of the post-ezistence of the soul."
p. 394.
4. Pringle-pattison, lOG, p. 391. Wahl points out that McTaggart does
not hold to the idea of time and is therefore a special type of
monist rather than a pluralist. POEA, p. 27.
5. Ibid., p. 392.
6. H. Wodehouse, in EHB X:663a,b«
7. Ibid., X:583a.
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1*
can yie say that saoh a being is not ricked?"
In his Dogmas of Heligion, MoTaggart discusses this problem
at length and concludes that the idea of omnipotancy on the part of
God would contradict the absolute individtzality of persons, \diich he
2. 3.
believed to be pre-exi stent and immortal. His God, and he was not sure
that he existed, was opposed to some extent by human beings and vas a
4.
finite person fighting on the side of good, who might or might not be
victorious. With James he leaned somewhat to polytheism.
7b. The border line position of Hastings Rashdall;
Professor Pringle-Pattison points out that Dr. Hashdall
also would probably repudiate Pluralism, as he expressly holds the
finite selves to be created. "But he has repeatedly introduced the fin*
5.
iteness of God as limited by other selves,** and has contended accordingly
for a distinction between God and the Absolute. He did not regard the
6.
whole of the Absolute as self-conscious; only God: but the Absolute
included God and all other consciousness. He loolced upon the Absolute
as composed of God and the many spirits.
1. "But supposing he has no control, or little, over his nature". So
Brightman, POO.
2* McTaggart, HIPS, p. 119.
3. "Probably nit" - S. S. Brightman.
4. Wahl, POEA, p. 27.
5. Mathe son, LHH, p. 243.
6. Pringle-Patti son, 106, p. 387: (Has Pringle-Pattison overlooked Rash-
dall* s first note on page 240, 7ol.II,TGE:"It will be observed that I
do not here assert that God is finite or that God is limited by a plu-
rality of independent, unoriginated, and isolated centres of conscious-
ness, and provoking pleasantries about polytheism and the like" ?)
7. Perhaps he meant with Bradiy, "God is but an aspect, and that must mean
but an appearance of the Absolute." Appearance and Reality , p. 448.
(London: Allen and Uhwin. (1893) 1925.)
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Raaihdall oonoeived God, Himself, as a good, eternal being
1.
who is limited by us who are created by Him, He wanted to conceive of
God as omniscient, but he also said that there were 'eternal necessitiew*
which are "part of His ovm eternal nature and which rendered it impos-
sible for Him to accomplish all the good ^ich woald be desirable: God
can only do and Icnows that He can only do the best that this constitution
of things admits***
Thus Hashdall agreed with MoTaggart on limiting the power
of God; and in claiming that persons are the only reality, and that
God, though conscious, is only one consciousness in the midst of other
consciousnesses*
*
3a* Omnipoten<^ and Evolutionary Thought
Contemporaneously with pluralist thought developed the
genetic philosophies* Hoffding states that Jakob Boehme Introduced
the concept of development into the German language. However, Boehme
maintained "that God is not subject to the law of evolution, but the
law has its foundations in him* God as spirit eternally perfected
within himself, would not need to create for the purpose of perfecting
himself •••••••• A God capable to grow would presuppose the presence
4.
of a superior God from which to draw power." This was probably the
1* Wahl, POM, p* 204*
2* Mathe son, LHH, p* 244*
3. Hoffding, HMP 1:76
4. Hartmann, LDJB p* 92: quoting Aurora, p. 23. Of* iCnudson, DG p* 266,
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1.
oonmonly aooepted view up to the Nineteenth Century* It was of the
nature of the world to change, but God was iramutable. Ever since the
publication of Darwin's great work in 1859, On the Origin of Species by
2.
Natural Selection , this view has been increasingly challenged. The
position has been: if God is actively conscious of His changing world,
must not His experiential content change? Poes not our knowledge of the
development of the world bear increasing testimony of such a God? The
rise of evolutionary thought in this period was the third great movement
in the changing idea of God*
lb> The skentioal position of Herbert Spencer;
Evolutionists generally thought that the haphazard method
used by natiure argued for chance, and the dependence of the new upon
the old ax^ed automatism* One of the first reactions to this was the
same as the first reaction to the new application of personality to
3*
God* We hear an echo from the Scottish school in the "unknowable" of
4.
Herbert Spencer. Evil was a problem even to Spencer, In his First
Principles, he wrote, "How is the existence of evil compatible with that
of an infinitely perfect being, for if he wills it not, his will is
thwarted and his sphere of action is limited." This may have been one
consideration that made him call his God the "Unknowable **• Can it be
1* As Osborne points out in From the Greeks to Darwin , opposition to the
idea of Evolution did not crystallize until the period of Milton,
However, this evolutionism was not generally thought of as affecting
God, (pp. 6-8,)
2, Sellars, PFF, p. 23S.
3, See p, 32,
4, In fact more than an echo. Spender spoke of his "Unknowable" as "car-
rying a step farther the doctrine put in shape by Hamilton and Han-
sel," See Bowne, Kant and Spencer , p, 223, (Boston, 1912).
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1.
possible that Spencer meant to say that the Infinitude of God is "tftilaao\^-
able"; henoe, neither affinnable nor contestable? And is it possible
that he resorted to his "Unknowable'* in order to reconcile, in the tm->
lighted regions of the irrational, a dualistic tendency with his Evolu-
tionary Monism? Spencer did claim that there was an absolute first cause,
but he failed to definitely relate this "cause" to God* His celebrated
agnosticism is really in regard to the nature of God.
2b» The more gnostic view of Henri Bergson ;
Spencer's interpretation was refuted especially by Lester
F* Ward, and Henri Bergson. Ward, though a positivist himself, attacked
the static Spencerian determinism with its myth of automatic progress
2.
and regress. He showed the p^chic influence of mind, and developed a
3.
conception of social tele sis* Bergson went even further. He claimed
that Spencer neither interpreted nor explained, but reconstructed "evolu-
4.
tion with the fragments of the evolved." In anaesthetizing reason with
its consciousness and purpose in an "Unknowable", Spencer had made ai^
real interpretation impossible.
But while Bergson approved a gnostic position, he failed,
as Spencer failed, to show the relation between God and the Absolute.
According to some of his interpreters he would make God identical with
the Absolute. According to the others, God is the creative, struggling
,
elan vital. H. M. Kallen takes the first view. He states, "(Che elan
1. First Principles.
2. Dynamic Sociology . Appleton, 1911. Of. Bogardus, History of Social
!Phought
. Chap. 17. (Eos Angeles: Miller (1922) 1928).
3» Creative Bvolutlon . trans, by A. Mitchell; N. Y.: Holt, (1911) 1924.
4. Ibid., p. 364.
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vital revealed in the manifest movement of existenee here and now •••• is
limited and inhibited by its opposite, matter, .•••••God, 'creator and
free* must be something 'vaster and higher*, the eternal spring of both
matter and life. It is the making, indifferently, of both matter and
elan, sind its bearing upon human destiny oannot with ai^ honesty be said
1.
to be propitious." Again, he says, "If the Slan vital is God, then the
2.
eternal center of creation from which springs matter is a super-God,"
3,
fhis also seems to be the view of Jaques CSievalier, a more recent student
of Bergson, In fact, Bergson himself wrote, "From all this we derive a
clear idea of a free and creating God, producing both matter and life at
4,
once,"
On the other hand, F* H, Foster would identify God with
Bergson* s Elan Vital. He thinks "there can be little doubt" but that
this is what Bergson himself would do, God "must be putting forth power
sufficient to make things well if he can. The life of the world seems
to be full, vibrant, intense, strenuous. And thus, the imperfection of
5,
the Vital Impulse must be God*s own imperfection, »• This Vital Impulse
he therefore sees as an "upward moving force, imperfect in power, un-
certain as to methods, struggling toward a great end, enlarging as it
6. 7.
goes," Professor Wllm makes a like interpretation of God, and the Elan
1, H, M. Kallen, Tgta, James and Henri Bergson (1914) p, 197f, quoted by
Foster, Amer, Jour, of Theol ., XXII (1918) : 284-485, "Some Theistio
Implications of Bergson' s philosophy,"
£, Ibid,, p, 206,
3, Henri Bergson . Trans, Lillian Clare: N. Y,: Macmillan, 1928, pp. 265-7,
4, In letter to L, H, Miller, quoted by Foster, loc. oit,, p. 284. note 1.
5, Foster, loo, cit,, p, 283,
6, Ibid,, p, 282.
7# Wilm, E. C: Henri Bergson: A Study in Radical Evolutiont H. y,tSturgis
(continued on next page).
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Vital, as does also Professor laarlatt who orlticlzes Bergson as being
'^mechano-duall Stic. **
3b> The growing "dynamic" conception of God.
If the latter view is true, Bergson greatly strengthened the
growing tendency in evolutionary thought to extend the dynanic conception
of the world to &od* As early as 1889, Wtmdt, in reaction to the laws
of the conservation of energy and of matter, had formulated the law that
"spiritual energy tends to increase." In 1912, Overstreet called' atten-
tion to the "increasing insistence among progressive writers that if the
conception of God is to be retained it must be the conception of a God
3.
growing with the world — a God in and of the world process." In 1918,
Foster, using the example of the artist, claimed that the increase of power
4.
is not physically conditioned, and that "God if he creates, also cannot
5.
be static, but grows." She tendency today, especially among evolutionists
6.
is to regard God as "dynamic" rather than static.
!Dhe new evolution of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
thus asked the question. Is God above evolution, of is God within evolu-
tion? This was still one of the mooted questions when the Vbrld War turned
and Walton, 1914. see p. 20., "God thus defined has nothing of the
already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom." And p. 145.
"The course of evolution is not mapped out, as it were, beforehand,
so that none, not even God, can see the end from the beginning."
1. Marlatt: Class Lectures: Principles of Moral and Religious Education,
(Unpublished).
2. In Systwn der Philosophie . p. 315 (1889) quoted by Poster, loo. cit.,
p. 268. Cf. Hastings, SHE.
3. Hlbbert Journal . Vol II (1912) p. 410.
4. Foster, loc. cit., p. t68. Gf. for rebuttal, Knudson, D6 p. 256.
5. Poster, loc. cit., p. 287. Cf. Carr, CBHE p. 85.
6. See Brightman, POG, p. 130. Cf. Tsanoff, NE, p. 399.
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most minds from systematic philosophy for a time.
4a • Resume of the Development
of the Doctrine prior to the World War
So the traditional idea of God continued to sail troubled
seas as thinkers sought to reconcile it with the knowledgeoof their da^.
The Scottish School felt it necessary to reject either the infinity or
the knowledge of God* !I7he Pluralist Schools limited God with beings
coexistensive with Himself, And the evolutionary philosophies either
pictured God as laboring under difficulties!' Himself getting into blind
1.
alleys, or else as being the source of all things both good and evil* It
is no wonder that the most prevalent conception of God during the first
two decades of the Twentieth Century, ^'as pantheistic*
1* Foster, loc. cit., p* 283*
a'I
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Chapter 17
RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE CJONCKPT
OF A FINITE &0D
*
la* The Goodness of aa Omnipotaat God challenged Iqr
'
the World War*
**He hated that He oaimot ohange His cold,
Hor otire its ache ••••••**
Callhan upon Setebos*
1,
Optimistic was the astern world until the oonfliot of
'fourteen turned its oiTilization into a drunken Tam 0*Shanter« Diffi-
culties in the idea of God, as already shown, had been chiefly specula-
tire* The World Wiar made them rudely practical* The valleys and shadows
of strife with the conscious and unconscious dominance of wracking fears
oast aside the niceties of evolution, and the problem of an infinite versus
a personal God* The world had found its own Golgotha, and in the twill^t
of its Tpres-Gallipoli-Mame-Argonne torment, it could not tell if God
had forsaken it, or if He was Himself again on the cross* The war intro-
2*
duced no new factors into the problem of evil, but like the Austrian ulti-
matum, it thrust forth involved questions: Is man's free will wholly respon-
sible for the war? Who gave him his free-will? Can a good God sanction,
or even permit, the greatest war in all history?
1* **As Chanticleer said, *An insect's death can teach us all disastert"
quoted Otto, TAI, p. 249*
2* See McConnell, IGL, p* 61*
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There is a strilcing, underlying parallelism in the iqystic
1. 2*
revelations of Boehme, the reflectire speenlations in Mll*s Essays, and
the spontaneous skeptic outory of the wounded officer to his "padre**,
Studdert-Kezinedy* !I*he officer had asked i^at God is like and Studdert-
Kennedy in reply had silently indicated a cruel fix
t
"What do you mean?' he said; *God cannot be like that.
God is Almighty, Maker of Heayen and earth, Monarch of
the world, the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords, Whose
will sways the world, That is a battered, wounded,
bleeding figure, nailed to a cross and helpless, defeated
by the world and broken in all but spirit* That is not
God; it is part of God*s plan: God* s irysterious, repul-
sire, and appar^tly perfectly futile plan for saving the
world from sin* I cannot understand the plan, and it
appears to be a thoroughly bad one, because it has not
saved the world from sin •*••••• Jesus Christ, I know
and admire, but what is God like?*** (3)
This cry was typical of many raised both at home, and on the battle-field*
The war marked the return of the problem of suffering as
4*
the decisive factor in the chaziging idea of God* Many reacted as Voltaire
had reacted two centuries earlier* The idea of a finite God approached
popularity* It spread widely in literaxy, theological, and philosophical
writings*
lb* Literary Erpressions ;
l,c*. _ROTiaine.J^ljLand_(ljBj60_--
_
1*
Jean Christophe stands as a fitting prologue to this move-
ment in literature. Although a pre-war novel, its psychological setting
1* See page 19f*
2* Cf* page 37 f.
3* Studdert-Kennedy, The Hardest Part, N* Y*:Geo* H* Doran Co*, (no date).
4. Cf. McConnell, IGL, p. 9; also article in Zion»s Herald, Nov. 11, 1931.,
p. 1418.
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is that of oonflict and revolt* Chrlstophe, a masiolan of genius,
attempting to maintain a life of integrity and unswerring honesty, is in
an endless search for the truth that is to be found in self, in soeietyt
and in life. This searoh leads him in a continual revolt against the lies
and sham of life, first in the little Rhine toum of his birth, and later
in Paris* The hostile uniTerse early talcing from him his faith in God,
the suooessiTO thivartlng of his life seems to confirm his atheism* Toward
his Journey* 8 End eren nature seems to join the strife:
"The slaughter aooomplished by man is so small a thing
of itself in the carnage of the universel The animals
devour eaoh other* The peaceful plants, the silent trees,
are ferocious beasts one to another*** (1)
But this insight seems to have brought to him the truth about his universe*
It is a place of carnage, because God, Himself, is struggling with it* In
the realization, bom out of a tempest his consciousness of God awakens:
"0 Thou, Thoul Thou art come back to me! Thou art come
back to mel 0 Thou, whom I had losti Hlhy didst Thou
abandon me?**
"To fulfil my task, that thou didst abandon* **
*»What Task?**
••J^ fight."
"Khat need hast Thou to fight. Art Thou not master of all?"
"I am not the master*"
"Art Thou not all that is?"
"I am not all that is * I am the Sternal light; I am not
an eternal destiny soaring above the fig^t*" (2)
1* Holland, Jean Christonhe . 111:328.
2* Ibid*, p* 335*
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, .."God Tjas not to hiin the impassive Creator, a Nero
from his tower of brass watching the burning of the city to
which he himself has set fire. God was fighting, God was
suffering For God was life, the drop of light
fallen into the darlmess, spreading out, reaching out, drizHc-
ing up the night*** (1)
_Herbert_Ge^orge j£ell^:__(1866_--
_ JL*
Not until the latter part of the second year of the war did
the idea of a finite God emerge very widely. At that time it receired its
most influential stating from the pen of H. G. Wells. In the latter part
of 1916 he wrote in one of his novels, ''Necessity is a thing beyond God —
beyond good and ill •••••(yet, God Is) greater than Nature or Neeessity,
for He is a spirit and they are blind, but not controlling them •••••• Hot
2*
yet^»*
(Ehe following year, he took up the idea in greater detail, and
published what is probably the best known exposition of his peculiar theology;
God, the Invisible King, IChls treatise criticized the historical compos-
ition of the traditional idea of God, and attempted to give the status of
what he conceived to be modem religion. He emphatically ruled out the
3^
Creator-God who made the viiole universe, affirming that He is a Teiled-
Belng" ^om we cannot know, identifying Him, thus, with the "Unconscious**
of Von Hartmann, or the "Unconditioned** of Hamilton, or the •*nnknowable'*
of Spencer, and leaving Him, now, wholly unrelated to the Universe. He
4. 5.
also ruled out the •*Llfe-Force*«, or the "Hill to be*»^ This he conceived to
!• Holland, Op« olt«, III:338. Cf^ Beekwlth, lOG, p^ 29«
2. Wells, MBSm, p. 406. See pp. 405-408*
3. Wells, GIK, p* 13. Cf. p. 100.
4. Ibld^, p. 15.
5* Ibid*, p* 16*
i
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be an agent of the Veiled-Being whioh extended the creation by its formation
of all the life foras. It seems to be amoral and to be paralleled only by
the Demiurge of the Gnostics* Wells* s real GrOd is apart from either of
1* 2«
these. He is to be found only within the self, "God comes we know not
3.
whence* •* He seems to be only an irrational Good-will ^ose only reason for
being is the empirical, practical fact of His existence*
She chief difficulty with this new dogmatism was that it
raised more questions than it solved* Its Life Force was purely a biologi-
cal entity, that told nothing concerning the Absolute; and the relation of
4.
the true God to the metaphysical ultimate was unexplained* lUr* Wells,
himself, was not satisfied with his strange Trinity* He has since pictured
God as the "Great Adrenturer'*, as a^lean, tired, intelligent-looking,
5*
oldish man, with an air of futile friendliness**, or, as the •'Undying Fire***
6*
Uore recently still he has changed to an agnostic stoicism*
So*. «.Other.£:^
The chief ralue of Mr* Veils* s writings was that he •*com-
7*
pelled a lai^e reading public to face the dark facts'* of the miverse*
But others were doing this too*
!I?he most graphic account of a finite God appeared in St*
1* McConnell, IGL, p* 59*
2* Wells, GIK, p* 18*
3* Ibid*, p* 18* Cf* Beokwith, lOG, p* 218*
4« Ibid*, pp* 100-101. See Brightman, POG, p* 104; Beckwith, IOG» p* 218*
Cf* also Butler who makes a distinction between God and the Absolute,
but fails at this point* God the Known, and God the Unknown*
5* Otto, TAI: pp. 254-256*
6* Horton, TMM, pp*(506) 5-6*
7* McConnell, IGL, p* 60*
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John Errine's norel, Ohanglne Winds :
**It seemed to him that God vras not a Being vnho miraoulously
made the world, but a Being who laboured at it, suffered
and failed, and rose again and aohiered ••••• He could
hear God, stumbling through the Universe, full of the agony
of desire, calling continually, *Let there be Light! Let
there be Light! (1)
So Jerome K* Jerome returned to the Greek Architect con>
ception; Johan Bojer conceived of a grim fate which "nothing in heaven
3«
or earth can vanquish;'* and Maurice Maeterlinck wrote of a God who "does
4.
not know everything and never has known everything,"
|gb# Theological Rgpresstonst
lojs. Jjrj. A.^Qtudcterjfe-Konnedj,:
The war, said Studdert-Kennedy, only "oast a fiercer 11^t
5.
upon the cross*" This English CShaplain was second only to ^lls as an
exponent of the finite God. To him, "God is helpless to prevent war, or
6*
else He wills it."
"Behold the bloody, fields of France,
They are God's Holy 1»i11." (7)
He concluded: "As far as I can see, there is no evidence for
believing that God is a Being #iose power no creature is able to resist,
8.
and an enoraous weight of evidence against it." The tendency in Studdert-
Kennedy was to reduce theology to Christology.
1. Quoted in Otto, TAl, p. 258.
2. All Roads Lead to Oalvarv . pp. 332-334.
3» The Great Hunger, p. 322.
4. The Hardest: In Les Sentiers dans la Montavne . 1919. quoted t)y J. H.
Holmes in Newton, (ed.) MIG, p. 117.
6. The Hardest Part , p. 186.
6* Ibid., quoted by Otto, TAI, p. 252.
7. Studdert-Kennedy, Lies , p. 130.
8. Studdert-Kennedy, I Believe: Sermons on the Apostle* s Creed, p. 67.
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2o._ H._Raeman:
Heaman, iHio left the Baptist Ghuroh for theologioal reasons,
wrote in 1917, **Do vte need a new idea of God? In this booJc he presents a
finite God, precariously in oontrol of the universe; "there has long heen a
case of nip and tuck between God*s power and the thwarting forces
1.
arrayed against Him*
31)» gheo-Philosophioal Eroressions;
Some thinkers saw quite clearly the philosophical implications
of the idea of a finite God» fhese tried to harmonize their philosophy
with their theology* Much in the foregoing views could be explained on
the basis of man* s free-will* But others saw a fundamental limitation upon
God over and beyond roan*s free-will:
iOi «^®Juali£,t^:_
E* B* Alexander sees God as opposed by an independent meta-
physical substance* "•*.*.the world is a dual reality* The perpetually
shifting and dying temporal processes stand in opposition to the eternal
2*
logos or divine will*** The divine will struggles for mastery over this
independent substance* He does not '*believe that God is all-powerful or
the Good all-prevailing* *****.Over and against Him there is evil and
3*
monstrosity*** This goes beyond Well's gnostic agnosticism to a **new Mani-
4*
chaeism, saying evil Is real and God has to straggle against it***
1* H* Quoted by Otto, TAX, p* 257*
2* H* B* Alexander, Reprinted in Robinson, ARP, p* 119*
3* H* B* Alexander, lAF, p* 307*
4. Vahl, POEA, p* 197*
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Relnhold Nlebuhr in his book, Doeg GiTi ligation Need ReligionT
holds to a dualism, al80« "Whether the dualian is one of mind and matter,
or thought and extension, or God and the devil, or foroe and inertia, it
1.
approximates the real facts of life." However, the nature of God*s
opposition is very different for him from tvhat it is for Alexander, To him,
2.
apart from the active ^11 ("Waywardness") of man, the resistance is only
one of pure inertia,"
A dualism, again, is implied in Hufus Joneses writings:
"But not everything in the universe is God ••••••• God is that intelligent
Spirit who is accomplishing the good •••••• Goodness is possihle only in
a world of contrasts."
Each of these dualists would probably say with Alexander,
"These twin dualisms (good vs* evil, nature vs« human nature, rational
4.
vs. intuitive reasoning) are the essence of Christianity*
^c^ _3^9_24oni.s^sj.
Opposed to these dualists and to all others ^o would liznit
God in any way by any power outside God* s own control, were those tHolO
upheld traditional theiatn*
The argument was first gy sternatically presented by Francis
J* McConnell in his essay. Is God Limited? This book grew, in part, out
5*
of the war, and was an attempt to answer the growing tendency to look upon
1» Niebuhr, DOUR, p. 218.
2. Ibid., p. 210.
3. Newton, MI6, pp. 62-63. "I think of Him as the Ground or Source of all
that can be called mind or reason in the universe." However, Of. his
pathways to the Reality of God . 1931, p. 209: "I am not here endorsing
James* s well-known conceptiAn of God which I do not share."
4. Alexander, in Robinson, AHP, p. 119. Of. Brightman, POG, pp. 177-178.
5. McConnell, IGL, p. 8«
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GrOd as limited. It v/ould see God as limited, not "by His own nature, or
by any natiire external to Him, but by the character of His own will, "If
1.
there are limitations which God assumes , they are assumed in the Spirit
2.
of CShrist." It would apply this to God*s determination of His own nature,
and in His relation to man and the physical world, Sxponents of the finite
God would probably admit the argument in regard to God*s own nature, and
in His relation to a world of free-beings, but would question if physical
evil eould be accounted for, thus, without compromising God* s goodness, or
power* They would asic, if God is only limited by Himself, why does He not
destroy evil? McConnell would answer, "Because evil is part of the pwsent
3.
plstn which God, having adopted, must maintain." "But i^ did God choose
the present plan in the first place?" "Because evil is due to the limi-
tations inherent in even the 'best possible* of finite worlds." McConnell
attempts to account for evil in terms of Leibniz* s theodicy which, fails
to account for the actual evil in the world, since it merely equates evil
5.
with finite-ness, and which actually limits God by tacitly assuming an
abstract possibility and impossibility, independent of the divine power,"
(Of. pp. 16-18).
Professor Edwin Lewis has more recently defended the same
thesis. "The only limitations that God is under are the limitations that
arise out of his own self-determined nature and that naturally go with his
1. Italics mine.
2. UoConnell, IGL, p. 296.
3. Ibid., p. 6Sf.
4. Ibid., p. 64.
5. Of. Tsanoff, NE, p, 370: "....the reduction of the antithesis good-evil,
to infinite-finite, replacing as it does a moral by a metaphysical dis-
tinction, virtually dismisses all the moral or value aspects of the
problem.
"

60.
1*
chosen purpose." God*s purpose is to 'bring free "and finite beings to
2*
genuine moral goodness.** S7il is a necessary element in this training.
"If anything can seem to justify to our minds the evil in question* it is
the belief that it is an inseparable element of a purpose of good." It
is rather difficult on this basis to account for animal suffering, and the
death "which comes to human beings )riao have never received the falness of
the moral training possible. It is strange that God continually has to
remove the products of his educational system, and start anew with little
babes or else admit a defeat.
More recently still. Hichard J. Cooke has written sdong the
same thought, "The almightiness of God is His power to do whatever is
rational The limitation of God is the volxmtary self-restraint
of his Power, since we must oorxoede that if he chose he could annihilate
5.
what opposes him......." It would se^ that such a God would annihilate
evil. Since He does not, it must be a part of God*6 plan. However, what
that plan is we cannot know because God "is not compelled by any necessity
6.
within or without to reflect or even to reveal his natiure in creation."
Bishop Cooke really abandons the problem on the basis of Hebrew agnosticism.
(Cf. p. 13.)
1. Lewis, GAO, p. 95.
2. Lewis, A Blanual of Christian Beliefs . N. Y. : Scribner»s, 1927. p. 59.
3. Ibid.
4. See GAO, p. 89.
5. Zion*s Herald, Nov. 11, 1931. P* 1421, col. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 1420, col. 2.
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2a« The Growing Issue Between a Vague
and a Definite God
In the meantime, the progress of science, stimulated Ity the
war* was exerting an important influence vq^on the changing conception of
God*
lb» Hie Progress of Eyolutionary !ISiought >
In the heart of the war period, (1916-1918) the realist*
Professor Alexander gave the Gifford Lectures on Space. Time, and Delty »
In these lecturer, Alexander referred to God as the Infinite, divine
1.
being* That this Infinite Being was '^helpless to prevent evil (because)
2.
• God does not foresee the evil or the good,** constituted no problem
3.
for him because his God had no personality* The really important thing
4*
is not God v&o is all (pantheian) but Deity which is **on the side of Good,**
5.
and in the evolutionary series always marks the next higher step upwards***
Lloyd Morgan blended the thought of Alexander and Bergson
6*
in his Snergent Svolution. He acknowledged God as a Directive Activity,
and the cause of novelty, yet tegan with a mechanistic aocoimt of the
world-process i^ich was really self-sufficient* Though he allowed for
the introduction of novelty, he referred its emergence to a combination
1* Alexander, STD 11:416*
2* Ibid*, p* 421*
3* Brightman, POG* p* 41*
4* Alexander, STD 11:414* **But the assertion that we have made is not
that evil does not exist in God — on the contrary it has been main-
tained to exist there, in God* s body —- but only as God's deity is
on the side of good, and not on the side of evil*"
5* Bri^tman, HV, p* 161*
6* Morgan, ES, p* 61. (Proc* of the 6th* Intemat* Conf,, 1926. p. 2f.
)
Df* Tsanoff, NS, p* 26*
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of elements already present in the ppeoeding stages of the process. In
1.
this vray the process tended to be preformatlonal*
Edmund Noble followed these in 1926 with PurposiYe Evolu-
tion* In him we see the age-old Greek-attitude; God as an Architect.
2.
"Creation is the reordering of ultimates that do not change."
The effect of this evolutionary thought was not further
to limit God*s power, but* as the late Professor Carr said, to render the
3.
idea of God '*yague and fomless."
2b. The vaaue God -srfiich Science gives.
"As a matter of fact science has been the driving force
which has compelled philosophers to give expression to the idea of God,
and it is the progress of science -niiich has required philosophy from time
4.
to time, to revise the concept of God." Hot only evolutionary thought,
but in general, the entire field of scientific endeavor has shoTOi this
tendency to raalce the idea of God, "a mystic haze".
Man* 8 geographical knowledge of his earth as a globe ended
forever the nebulous belief that God had an undiscovered home on some
high peak, in some Arthurian realm, or in the near-by sky. His geological
discoveries disrupted Archbishop Usher's chronology. It increased the
age of the universe so enormously that it did not suffice to speak of each
5.
day of creation as a thousand years; even this must be ezt ended "seventy-
1. Marlatt: Lectures in Religious Education, Nov. 1930.
2. Noble, PE, p. 33.
3. Carr, CBRE, p. 86. Also states, "The plain truth is that the evolutionary
theory has antiquated all the theodicles because it has rendered
maaningless the attributes of omniscience and benevolence ^ich give rise
to the problems of error and evil."
4. Oarr, loc. oit., p. 71f.
5. II Peter 3:8.
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times seven." His astronomioal se arch and research of the heavens re-
vealed his universe to be only a unit in one of many galaxies. Conceived
in terms of process and magnitude, it threatened to extend time and space
along with thought into infinity. Interpreted in the light of physical
1.
laws, the question of an ultimate "frame" arose with its (unnecessary)
imjpLications that if such a frame existed, its maker and sustainer, God
migkit exist as well, and, if not, "relativity" was universal. The net
result is a God which popular thought finds it easier to conceive in terms
of an abstract principle of concretion and regulation than as personality
self-endowed with purpose, consciousness, and an active, personal interest
in man.
ihen the modem man then turns from the "starry heavens
above" to the "moral law within", he finds that biological evolution seem-
ingly has destroyed the sanctity even here. £he present moral drder would
appear to be a natural result, found to be instrximentally necessary in
an evolving wrld, therein, rather than an a priori law laid down by a
transcendent, yet immanent God. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive
of an adequate God even on the basis of moral lawgiving. We are tempted
to conclude with Carr that:
3.
"W9 can fashion no likeness of it (the life-force), not
because to liken the supreme being to some earthly
shape savours of sacrilege, but because man himself
with all his furniture of aesthetic imagery is only one
mode of the divine being." (4)
1. See Eddington, Hatxure of the Physical V/orld . Chap. II, and Cf. p. 61f.
H. Y.: ]l<!aomillan, 1928.
2. Carr, CBRE, Chaps. 5*6.
3. lehich, if not God must be within God.
4. Carr, CBHE, p. 66.
I
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Yet, this is to abandon God to the "ttaknowable*" So in the moral as well
as the physical realm, the idea of God tends to be diffused in the morasses
of the universal*
gb> The resulting problemt
Though it is true that scientists today are nearly unani-
mously agreed in positing such a God as we have described, such a God
has little value for religion. The insistent problem of reconciling the
God of religion, with the God of philosophy remains. Religion demands
a definite idea of a trolly good God. Philosophy, in order to interpret
the scientific data, demands a comprehensive idea of God. The answer
would seem to be "pantheism." Yet, the reality of suffering still vivid
from the World War, unrelieved by disillusion regarding the possible
values in that war, and augmented by the present depression and troubled
state of -world affairs, makes such an answer unpopular as well as im-
practical.
3a. Dr. Bri^tman* s theory of a
"finite God"
Uhique among the attempts to solve this problem is the
1.
solution presented by Professor Brightman. The solution has grown out
2.
of a careful survey of the field over a period of years, and a recog-
nition of the dangers inherent in the indefinite expansion of the idea
1. Argument given in Problem of God (1930) and further in The Finding of
God (1931).
2* Brightman, P06, p. 10,
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1.
of God. It is an attempt to give philosophy a new conception of God that
will satisfy the demands of science and meet the needs of religion.
According to this theory, God is a person supremely "conscious,
supronely valuable, and supremely creative." He is the sole creator of
all things and there is nothing external to Him save as He wills its crea-
tion. However, "the eternal nature of God contains a principle of delay
2.
and suffering within itself.** There is within Him, in addition to his
reason and his active, creative will, a passive element which enters into
every one of His consolous states, as sensation. Instinct, and impulse
enters the conscious experience of men. This element, which is called
the "Given" has five chief characteristics. It is oouscious and not a
mysterious entity. It is complex as it stands for the entire Itaoreated
and eternal nature of God. It is eternal In that it has been oo-ezisten-
sive with God and probably will never be Trolly eradicated. It is Internal
3.
in the sense that God is the source of everything. And it Is controlled
4.
in the sense that law and reason and purpose are supreme in this universe.
5.
Separate from the "Given" is the divine will which is
Tdiiolly good and creative. The will is in a continual struggle with the
"Giveir to create and still control. Out of this struggle the world is
6.
created. The will is the active element, in God, and the element in which
man is especially interested. Although it is perfectly good, its work
!• Brightman, POG. p* 84.
2. Brightman, POG, p. 119.
3. Brightman, FG, pp. 174-177.
4. Ibifl., p. 90.
5. POG, p. 127.
6. Ibid., p. 113,
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1.
upon the "Given" is never perfectly done* God's goodness, therefore,
2.
is not perfection, but infinite perfectibility. Likewise, although the
will does not change, its action upon the "Given" produces change so
3.
that time enters into the very being of God, and He becomes the "dynamic"
God of Evolution,
Such a God obviously is not omnipotent. In addition to
4.
the unknown choices man makes with his free will, God is limited by this
element within Himself with which he is engaged in struggle. Since His
will is perfectly Good and is not in danger of being vanquished, "!I!he
5.
Given" being passive, he meets the religious need. And since, God meta-
physically stands alone. He meets the scientific need for a slzigle cause
6.
behind all things*
1« Brightman, FG, p. 176.
2* Btightman, Ibid., p. 182f.
3. POG, p. 129.
4. Course Outline for "Religious Values", p. 42*
5. Dean Knudson says, "Belief in the goodness of God lies at the basis of
religion. ..Idea that a good purpose lies back of the universe. It
is that and almost that alone in ^ich religion is interested." Leo?
ture in OTheologioal Aspects of Philosophy, Feb. 24, 1932.
6. Of. Boehme: "God did not make the world out of something intellectually
conceivable or out of something that was not Himself; aeither does
a man create the images which constitute his thoughts out of anything
outside of his own mind." (Hartmann, LDJB, p. 92).
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4a. Other Recent Followers of a "finite
&od«
Although Dr. Brightman* s theory is imlque in many respects
it, "by no means, has stood alone, even during the short time it has been
1.
in print. His Problem of &od hardly had "been published before a kindred
view advocating a Promethean religion and a finite God appeared in Profea-
2. 2a.
sor Montague* s little book. Belief Unbound.
She following year, idien Dr. Brightman published the
3.
Finding of God , two other veiy similar books also were published by
Harry A. Overstreot and Badoslav Tsanoff. Professor Overstreet approached
the problem chiefly from the findings of science and specifically from
4.
the conception of emergent evolution or creative evolution. In his
5.
Enduring Quest , according to Henry P. Van Dusen, he presents his "conclu-
sion of a struggling and creative God, and finds his mind in essential
accord with Professor Montague. God is *the quickening vitality of the
universe in infinite degree the everlasting life which moves toward
6.
wholeness .... the God operative within ourselves.***
Professor Tsanoff approached the problem almost viholl^ from
7.
the history of the problem of evil. In the Nature of Evil , he does not
definitely advocate a "finite God", but he does recognize a very real
1. K. 7.: Abingdon. April, 1930.
2. New Haven,: Yale University Press, Oct., 1930.
2a. Professor Lewis conments: "Montague* s plea for •a Promethean religion*
is one of the best recent statements of the case for a growing God.»»
GAO, p. 101.
3. N. 7.: Abingdon. April, 1931.
4* See next note (#5), p. 185.
6. !Phe Enduring Quest ; a Search for a Philosophy of Life" N. Y.tNorton, 1931.
6. "Trends in Contemporary Theiem", Religion in Life 1:185.
7. K. Y. : Maomillan, Jan., 1931*
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oflBitrary factor in Ms monian. Concerning this he writes: "there is a
drag in the universe and there is likewise an urge; the drag and the urge
appear to be conflicting factors, but they are factors in one coanic pro-
le
cess, and the true philosophy is one that can take account of them both,"
5a« A Saxrey of the Development since 1914
In looking back, briefly, over the development of the idea
of a finite God since 1914, we see that two factors combined in a curious
way to make the idea one of the major and growing tendencies in theology
and philosophy, Olhese factors were the war and the progress of Scientific
Thought,
The war brought a new and vivid realization of the reality
of suffering that apparently was due to natural evil as well as human sin,
Ihis realization made the pantheism prevalent in the prsceding decade most
unsatisfactory, and made many theists also argue that the existence of evil
proved either that God was not viiolly good, or else was not sufficiently
powerful to overcome all opposition to the good. Many of the conceptions
of a '^finite God" which resulted seemed strained and feverish. It was
rather generally believed that they -ssouLd die with the close of the war.
However, the close of the war did not bring the expected relief, Ihe fruits
of victory were foimd to be chaos, poverty, disease, and unemployment, and
the problem of suffering maintained a dominant place in modem thought.
Meanwhile the Progress of Scientific Thought had rendered
1, Tsanoff, NE, p, 27,

69
the traditional view of God almost meaningless. Man*s belief that he -was
the final objective process received almost a death blow* and his recog-
nition of the wastefulness and suffering as well as the thtrairting of purpose
made the ways of an omnipotent God seem strange indeed. Impressed with
the reality of evil he could no loziger lightly dismiss such problems as
a necessary part of the natural process, and still believe that that pro-
cess was the free creation of a benevolent God. The theory of a finite
God was found to have philosophic value in the explanation of scientific
thought, and one of the tendencies in pre sent-d£Q^ thought is to accept
the theory in one fom or another as the best solution of all the probl^s
that appear to be contained in actual reality*
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CSiapter V
The idea of a "finite God**, thus, has extended across the
centxiries of thought. It does not stand lllce a "boulder upturned in the
field of modem speculation. It is more like a river of thought that
flows to us out of the past. It doubtless will cut deep channels into
the future*
la. Re some
In the development of the idea of God prior to the modem
period, the idea of a "finite God** seemed to arise as a natural corollary
of monotheism* In the Greek mind there was a haunting sense of the reality
of matter: Plato and Aristotle considered God to be, not so much the Creator
of the world as the Architect of it* On the other hand, the Hebrews main-
tained the creatorship of God, but never gave satisfactory solutions to the
problem of evil* They were essentially agnostic in regard to the relation
of evil to the nature of God*
After the dawn of the Christian era, the Gnostics and Mani-
chaeans continued an onphasis upon the Greek position, but made the view
extreme by regarding matter as ^olly evil, and other than God* In opposi-
tion to these, the Christian Church emphasized the Hebrew monism and doc-
trine of creation, and accepted the theodicy of Augustine as an explanation
of evil* Becoming Roman Catholic in the struggle, the C3iurch won out and
maintained the idea of God as Infinite throughout the Middle Ages upon an
1* See H* P. Van Dusen, "Trends in Contemporary Theism" Religion in Life
Vol. 1, #2, who points out that the idea is receiving favor both
from Orthodox Theists and Humanists*
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1, 2.
essentially agnostio basis, by an a priori method and a negative theology.
The Modem Sra ushered in by the Henai ssanoe created a more
positive attitude in theology* It replaced a priori reasoning with the
method of scientific induction and the resulting empirical rationalism claimed
that the order In the Universe only required a First Cause (IPatchmaker) . It
could find no evidence for a personal God* The prevailing mood in theology
became Deistic. Pierre Bayle, the Frenchman, attempted to discredit the
resulting rationalisn by appealing to sicepticism. But in so doing he denied
the theodicy of Augustine; essentially attacked religious faith; and
centered attention once more upon the problem of evil* Uhder the stimulus
of Bayle*s claim that suffering in the world was inconsistent with the idea
of an all-powerful God, new solutions were offered to the problem of evil^
which limited God in various ways: Leibniz held to a thorough-going rational-
ism and limited God by a rational necessity beyond His free-will; Schelling
and Hegel, building from Boehme's theosophical cosmogony, limited the will
of God by an involuntary ground in God*s nature; Hume, left his thorough-
going empiricism to posit a God, but inferred from his empiricism that He
vas finite; and Voltaire and Bousseau reverted to the Greek conception
that God was limited by matter, a second and an independent reality*
During the Nineteenth Century and the first part of the
[Twentieth, the question of God*s finitude became chiefly a speculative
issue centering around the metaphysical status of personality and the
1* "The omnipotence of God is a dogma of the Catholic faith contained in
all the creeds and defined by various councils*** Cath* Eac »« V:252a*
2, Through Clement of Alexandria "the philosophical absolute entered Christ-
ian theology and has remained to plague theologians from that day to
this*** McGiffert, HDT 1:205.

individual selves. The Scottish Sohool believed that infinity and person-
ality were niutually exclusive. Looking upon God as the "philosophical
absolute** they consequently conceived Him to be infinite and refused to
credit personality with metaphysical reality. Accordingly, they called
God the *'Unconditioned'* and took refuge in an agnosticism concerning the
nature of God*
The Pluralist s took an opposite view. dThey followed an
empirical method. Holding to the metaphysical reality of the many
selves, they generally extended the concept of personality to God, Him-
self, and limited God by the existence of the many other **realities**.
MeanAvhile the development of evolutionary thou^t increased the difficiil-
tles of the problem. Studies in creative evolution gave evidence of a
ptirpose straggling against opposition to express itself in creation*
God must be either the blind source of both the purposive element and
the opposition, or else He must be the source of the former alone.
The tense emotional strain growing out of the World War
from 1916-1918 resulted in the formulation of a number of very strange
conceptions of a •*finite God**, most of which were shoftly after discredit-
ed or abandoned by their authors. However, since the World War two ten-
dencies have been very evident. One is a deep recognition of the reality
of evil and a distinct aversion to having evil explained away as illusion
or by any generalizing theodicy. The other is a growing recognition that
the traditional view of God is wholly unable to explain many of the natural
processes that careful scientific study has revealed. The first tendency
is attracting the more favorable attention of orthodox theists to the
idea of a **finite God*» and the second tendency is attracting the more
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1.
favorable attention of Humanists* Present foznulations of the "finite
God" both seek to offer better solutions of the problem of evil, and to
giye a definite content to the concept "Godi^i In view of the historical
background of the Idea and the strategic way in which the Idea is grounded
in contemporary thought, the suggestion that the "finite God" may supplant
Humanism as the strongest opponent of a full theism is deserving of the
most serious consideration*
«
*
1.
2.
See note 1, page 70*
Ibid,
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